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Table of Contents

Editorial. The Standards Movement and the Adequacy Approach to School Equity.
Dale T. Snauwaert and Jeffrey Kane 2

Teaching for Wisdom.
Tobin Hart 3

Dewey and the Romanticism of Holistic Education.
Geoff Taggart 17

Teaching as a Moral Enterprise.
David Brell 23

In Search of the Holocaust.
Laila Lipetz 30

Quantum Metaphors and the Study of Mind-Brain.
Delores D. Liston 36

Heinz Werner: Mapping the Territory between Scientific and Poetic Understanding. Will Cosby 44

Book Reviews

The Heart of the Matter: Teacher Educators and Teacher Education Reform by Andra Cole, Elijah Rosebud, and Gary Knowles (Reviewed by Lisa Finkel) 56

Codes and Contradictions: Race, Gender Identity and Schooling by J. D. Weiler (Reviewed by Paulette Patterson Dilworth) 59

Elusive Culture: Schooling, Race, and Identity in Global Times by Daniel A. Yon (Reviewed by Gretchen McAllister) . . 62

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Editorial

The Standards Movement And the Adequacy Approach To School Equity

The custom and practice of liberal democratic societies concerning the just distribution of social goods and rewards is meritocracy, or distribution on the basis of merit rather than inheritance. The articulation of state and national educational standards is both an issue of educational improvement *and* distributive justice. Meritocracy as a system of distributive justice is both ambition- and endowment-sensitive, in the sense that distributive determinations are based on a consideration of both effort and talent. The more talented and ambitious one is the better one's performance and, in turn, the more social goods and rewards one receives. A meritocratic system of distribution thus replaces heredity with performance as its distributive principle.

The standards movement is justified in various political and educational circles as an instrument of both educational improvement and distributive justice. By establishing universal standards of performance (and thus high expectations) enforced by high stakes testing, students will perform at a guaranteed level of educational achievement, with the result that the imperatives of equal educational opportunity will be satisfied. This formula, however, is incapable of breaking down the persistent and powerful relationship between social class, educational achievement, and income, for it neither redistributes cultural capital nor provides the resources necessary to provide sufficient compensatory and remedial opportunities. In the long run the standards movement will reinforce class-based stratification, and the contradictions of American meritocracy will become even more transparent.

High stakes tests are purported to be either a measure of academic achievement or aptitude; however, it is apparent that these tests reflect the social class background of the students more than either their ability or their achievement. The best predictor of performance on these tests is family income. For example, for every increment of $10,000 in family income there is an increase in the student's SAT scores of 30 points on average (see Peter Sack's *Standardized Minds*). The class-based nature of the SAT has lead universities such as the University of California to reconsider its use as an admission criterion. If educational performance is grounded in social class, then our "meritocracy" is neither ambition- nor endowment-sensitive. That is, the distribution of social goods and rewards tends to be based not on performance per se but on inheritance. Stratification is thus ultimately class-based.

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—Dale Snauwaert and Jeffrey Kane

Teaching For Wisdom

Tobin Hart

Wisdom does not result from the accumulation of facts but from the cultivation of the ability to "look at things from a greater height."

Educational practice and policy remains focused on the accumulation of facts and the development of basic skills. However, in a world flooded with information and increasing in complexity what may be required for fulfillment and even survival is not simply acquisition of more information or skills but the ability to use this knowledge wisely. In the expanding sea of information how do we cultivate the capacity to see what is of importance and apply that knowledge in ethical and meaningful ways? Acquisition of information, mastery of skills, and the power of the intellect give us tools to navigate, change, even destroy the world, but the capacity of wisdom is required if we are to grow the soul of world and our own soul along with it. This paper will explore the nature of wisdom and how educational practice can nurture it.

What is Wisdom?

We recognize it, we talk of it, it is described in all of the worlds sacred traditions, yet wisdom remains difficult to define precisely. Thomas Aquinas, the 16th century theologian, gives us an image to consider when he writes that "wisdom differs from science in looking at things from a greater height" (in Gilby 1967, 364). He said that it involves *gnome*, or the ability to see through things.

Wisdom does not come from amassing bits of information; it is not a thing that's accumulated, not an *entity*. Instead it is an *activity* of knowing. We don't possess wisdom as if it were an object, instead we act wisely.

Ralph Waldo Emerson describes wisdom as a blend of the perception of what is true with the moral sentiment of what is right (Sealts 1992, 257). As is the case with moral decisions, wise action moves beyond mere self-interest. Jesus was said to have turned over the tables of the money changers who were doing business in a holy temple; Martin Luther King, Jr., organized a sit-in at a lunch counter in Montgomery,

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Alabama, in an attempt to challenge segregation; Gandhi's radical non-violence directly confronted the authority of the British Empire. We would not say that these actions were "smart," but they were wise. In this sense, wisdom does not simply serve individual growth but growth in general. The actions of Jesus, King, and Gandhi not only helped to define their own lives but helped human society to grow. Lawson (1961, vii) concludes that "wisdom lies in human action which possesses both intellectual and ethical orientation; and the promotion of such wisdom is the task of education."

We know people who are brilliant intellectually but far from wise. Smart people sometimes act unwisely, falling prey to fallacies of invincibility or omnipotence or to narcissism. Some individuals may be able to navigate with "success" in the world. Such "fundamental pragmatics of life" are certainly valuable and have even been described as a component of wisdom (Baltes and Smith 1990, 87), but they do not necessarily see things "from a greater height," integrate the heart, and see beyond self-interest; consequently, lives guided only by such pragmatics seem to be wanting in some very central way. Orwoll and Perlmutter (1990) recognize this missing dimension as a level of personality development that is necessary to transcend narcissism, and personal needs, thoughts, and feelings. Without adequate development, people may see how to gain from the world but miss the opportunity to develop the world at the same time.

On the other hand, we know people who are not intellectually brilliant but who are able to use their understanding to act wisely. We say they have character, virtue, and insight. They can see what is important and what is less so, and they act from this knowledge. They recognize both forests and trees and can discern the relative balance and the integration of each perspective. At times, they may tap into a vein of wise simplicity in the midst of perplexity. In fact, while knowledge and intelligence are often equated with complexity, wisdom often emerges as elegantly simple. This is not a simplicity born of ignorance but a simplicity that is close to what is essential in life; it cuts to the chase; it sees through the cloud of complexity.

Wisdom is distinguished from bare intellect especially by its integration of the heart. While modern conceptions locate the most essential knowing in the head, sacred traditions identify it with the heart. For example, the Chinese word *hsin* is often translated as mind but includes both mind and heart. This emphasis on the heart has been referred to as the eye of the soul for Plato, the eye of the Tao (Smith 1993), South on the Native American medicine wheel (Storm 1972). In the Christian bible both Matthew and Luke speak of a single eye which lights the whole body like a lamp and without which "how great is the darkness" (Smith 1993, 18). We might even think of wisdom as the power of the mind to honor the insight of the heart.

Wisdom cuts to what is of importance, but not through calculations or shrewdness. The deepest insights, the authentic revelation, the healing vision, often come more directly, as an intuition. Such insight is described as an inner experience or inner knowing to indicate that we intimately embody this knowing within ourselves. The sacred traditions suggest various means such as prayer, meditation, service, and contemplation to awaken this inner knowing, but wisdom cannot be trained or acquired directly. We cannot say, "memorize this and you will be wise." It is brought forth more subtly. But it can be nurtured by our practices and priorities in the classroom.

Entering Mystery

It is difficult to find any genuine consideration of wisdom in education. Why is wisdom so absent from educational aims and practice? Rorty (1979, 61) suggests that the Cartesian shift marked the "triumph of the quest for certainty over the quest for wisdom." The goal thus became rigor, prediction, and control rather than wisdom or peace of mind. But this quest for certainty is a futile or delusional task since "what is really 'in' experience extends much further than that which at any time is known" (Dewey 1958, 21). To express it in another way, we simply cannot control or know it all; if we try to, our tight and focused grasping does not leave space enough for wisdom. This intolerance and fear of ambiguity and the unknown contributes to the sterilization and commodification of knowledge, where single correct answers,

fear of making mistakes, and multiple-choice exams are the gatekeepers of certainty. Wisdom allows space for ambiguity. For teachers and especially administrators and elected officials, there is security in certainty: We can name it, measure it, write reports with graphs about it, and hold others accountable to it. When we stretch away from certainty, we make ourselves (and the material) vulnerable. Few of us get past our personal need for control and predictability to risk the unknown and intentionally put our own vulnerability or that of the material in plain view. And yet vulnerability seems essential for our growth:

> And all the while, deep inside, I know what I have always known: that the knowledge will never be enough. This is the secret we keep from ourselves. And the moment it is revealed, we become aware of a need for something else; for the wisdom to live with what we do not know, what we cannot control, what is painful—and still choose life. (Dreamer 1999, 45)

The space, flow, and vitality of a classroom change when conscious vulnerability is present in the teacher. By moving out from behind the protection of certainty, curriculum, and role, the teacher invites the student to do the same. Vulnerability does not mean becoming passive or giving power away; it means being open to possibility, which opens the wisdom space. Vulnerability means tackling our fears head on. Ambiguity and vulnerability are allies of wisdom.

Not every learning situation is appropriate for increasing ambiguity. When we ask for the correct answer to a basic mathematics problem, we want a particular answer. When we ask students to engage deductive reasoning to draw a straightforward logical inference, we are looking for less ambiguity, not more. In these examples we are using the tools of intelligence. But with most topics, there is an opportunity to create the dynamic tension of ambiguity and, in turn, open the wisdom space to engage the student at a very deep level. We do this when we lead off the lesson with an honest question that has no simple preset answer. We ask "What are the causes of violence in our culture and in our school?" instead of truncating the wisdom space with "What are the five causes of violence that our text discusses?" Of course we want the student to know the text, but if our questions merely dead-end there, we have missed an opportunity for the growth of wisdom through ambiguity, vulnerability, and mystery. The text should be drawn on as part of a dialogue rather than as a diatribe.

Instead of grasping for certainty, wisdom rides the question, lives the question. "The wise person views himself and others as engaged in an unending dialectic with each other and the world" (Sternberg 1990, 150). An unending dialectic is an activity that raises anxiety in the one-right-answer world of most contemporary schooling. When a question is treated primarily as a problem to be solved with certainty, the question is set up in opposition to the questioner. From the start, the question becomes something to beat, to conquer. This may be playful or deadly serious and represents the best of intelligent engagement. Wisdom treats the question differently. It *seeks* questions, as if looking for the best fruit on the tree. It then bites into the question, living it, allowing it to fulfill its purpose as nourishment. Whereas intelligence will cut, dismantle, and reconstruct the question in order to work toward certainty, wisdom rides the question to see where it goes and what it turns into. Rilke (1993, 35) offers this advice:

> Be patient toward all that is unresolved in your heart…. Try to love the questions themselves…. Do not now seek the answers, which cannot be given because you would not be able to live them—and the point is to live everything.

Wisdom seeks and creates questions. Arlin (1990) describes "problem finding," identifying the most salient problems, as being closely associated with wisdom. Problem finding allows us to move beyond conceptual limits (i.e., the problem as given) in order to reframe and synthesize. We can encourage questions as much as answers in the classroom by making a small but significant turn in what we ask for and reward. For example, in an exam or in a class discussion, simply asking for questions that the students would ask about the topic, what they are curious about, what they really want to know but have been afraid to ask, serves to open up the wisdom space. Physicist David Bohm (1981, 25) explains that

> questioning is … not an end in itself, nor is its main purpose to give rise to answers. Rather,

> what is essential here is the whole flowing movement of life, which can be harmonious only when there is ceaseless questioning.

Pablo Neruda's *The Book of Questions* (1991, 24) provides a poetic and playful hint of this "whole flowing movement" through the art of questioning:

> Is 4 the same 4 for everybody?
>
> Are all sevens equal?
>
> When the convict ponders the light is it the same light that shines on you?

In addition to attending to the question as posed, we are also conditioned to answer a question as soon as it is asked. This too reinforces the answer and leaves the question behind. There may be hardly a breath between the question and our eagerness to answer it. But it is from this gap, breath, or moment of silence that wisdom emerges. One simple exercise invites students to generate questions instead of answers about a particular event or idea (e.g., a Civil War battle, a science demonstration, a story). These remarks can include students own reactions and associations such as, "What does this have to do with my life?" or statements such as, "Something about this really excites (or bothers) me, I wonder what it is." In one variation of this exercise, students can anonymously write the questions on an index card to be shared out loud with the class by a designated reader. These are not immediately to be answered; they are just to be heard. We may place a "question chair" in the middle of the classroom and when there are questions we speak the question to the chair rather than to the teacher or another student. No one is allowed to answer the question directly; it is simply allowed to sit and simmer. Other questions may follow. Initially this is awkward and students fall back onto habits of looking to the teacher, forgetting to talk to the chair, or providing a quick response to the question. But with just a few reminders, space opens up in this situation because the emphasis is on welcoming questions without tidy answers. The feeling of competition or resistance in the typical one-right-answer classroom opens up into mystery: we don't know what will come, and I am always surprised by the deepening quality of questions and perspectives that I had not previously considered. The process is less like an assembly line and more like an artist's studio, the atmosphere gradually shifts, and I imagine that the space inside the student shifts and opens as well.

The Quaker tradition provides a powerful method, called a "clearness committee" (see Livsey and Palmer 1999, pp. 43-48), for clarifying decisions. A member of the community can simply call upon other members of his or her choosing to sit together and ask questions about a concern or choice that is being faced (e.g., "Should I take this job?" "What should I do with my life?"). The committee is not there to offer opinions or advice but simply to pose honest questions and listen. The point is to help one listen to one's inner knowing. We can use the spirit of the clearness committee when students are instructed to present, to a small group in the classroom or to the class as a whole, their topic for their term paper, or their understanding of some concept that they have been studying. I often have small groups serve as mini-clearness committees. Given only minimal reminders about sticking to open and honest questions and acting in goodwill, the receiver of the questions regularly experiences an opening or clearing of awareness.

Wisdom asks questions about questions, not so much to close in and trap the answer but to see what the question has to tell us about ourselves and our world. "What is the lesson here?" "What is the big picture?" "What can this teach me?" In this way, the question (as well as the universe) serves both as a mirror and a looking glass. Our reaction to the question, our feelings of superiority or inferiority, and our solutions themselves reveal the limits or edges of our seeing or insight. Often statements are embedded within questions. Sharing questions helps to expose those statements about who "I" am, what "my" perspective and projection is, and what "I" want. Wisdom acknowledges that we don't know, or at least that we know incompletely; once this is accepted, it frees us for true learning. In this way, "ambiguity potentiates learning" (Bateson 1999, 137). Once we stop fighting the question and the situation and give up our quest for domination and certainty, we are really free to see what they have to offer. This is as true in meeting a person as it in meeting a question.

As we welcome ambiguity, attempt to balance an "unending dialectic," and "live everything," we

open up, not to the domination of the question, but to insight born of awe. In his study of the ancient prophets, Heschel (1972, 78) concludes that wisdom comes through awe and reverence:

> The loss of awe is the great block to insight. A return to reverence is the first prerequisite for a revival of wisdom…. Wisdom comes from awe rather than from shrewdness. It is evoked not in moments of calculation but in moments of being in rapport with the mystery of reality. The greatest insights happen to us in moments of awe.

Awe, wonder, reverence, and epiphany are drawn forth not by a quest for control, domination, or certainty, but by an appreciative and open-ended engagement with the questions: this is why such qualities as the ability to listen, empathize, and comfort with ambiguity (Sternberg 1990) are associated with wisdom.

We come to wonder, and in turn to awe and wisdom, though our vulnerability and openness. As we open up questions, a space is created: the wisdom space. And from this space we can enter the mystery: "Mystery sucks at our breath like a wind tunnel. Invites us into it. Let us pray and enter" (Richards 1989, 8).

Defining Oneself Authentically and Spontaneously

Teaching for wisdom constantly asks who we are and who we are becoming. This unfolding revelation is a movement toward an authentic life. Thomas Merton (1979, 3) writes that

> the purpose of education is to show a person how to define himself authentically and spontaneously in relation to the world—not to impose a prefabricated definition of the world, still less an arbitrary definition of the individual himself.

When the inner life is attended to on a daily basis, it does not breed narcissistic preoccupation or indulgence but instead the opportunity for a deep meeting at the intersection of inside and outside. All the mystics and sages affirm the Delphic Oracle's admonition, "Know thyself," and live true to your authentic nature. Inward awareness is not only important to provide a kind centerpoint but also because it reveals the intersection of our individual depth with a more universal depth. The universe lies not only about us but also within us; the outside can reveal the inside and vice versa. Emerson (1968, 47, 46) tells us that

> in yourself is the law of all nature…. in yourself slumbers the whole of reason; it is for you to know all; it is for you to dare all…. Man is surprised to find that things near are not less beautiful and wondrous than things remote. The near explains the far. The drop is but a small ocean. A man is related to all nature.

The inside is completely bound to the outside in a dialectic of its own. With respect to perception, the inside co-constructs the outside. As outside and inside meet in awareness we begin to recognize our embeddedness in the physical, social, political, environmental, and linguistic worlds. For example, Socrates said, ideas never come out of him; they always came from the person he was talking with. "Nothing creates 'in and by itself.' When people and things interact, they are in a process of becoming 'for each other'" (McNiff 1992, 37).

In addition, the inside-outside dichotomy is a false one, that is, a relative one. If our openness and connection are deep enough, our inside (i.e., consciousness, body, etc.) may no longer be distinct from the outside. When our consciousness opens and experiences deep interconnection, we do not experience the other as separate from us; experience arises without a distinct origin.

There is no need or no way to force this process of self-discovery. We open gradually through the small steps of authenticity, through being truly honest with ourselves. Polonius, Hamlet's intended father-in-law, offers the formula for wise transformation: "This above all, to thine own self be true." Authenticity begins as a courtship with our interior and ends as communion with the world. Martin Buber (1975, 251) recounts an old Hasidic tale that captures the central importance of being true to oneself. As an old man, Rabbi Zusya said, "In the coming world, they will not ask me: 'Why were you not Moses?' They will ask me: "Why were you not Zusya?'"

One of the ways we discover who we are is by asking: "What do we love?" "What brings joy and wholeness?" In this way each student's emerging self is the curriculum (Hopkins 1970). Krishnamurti (1974, 76) says, "Right education is to help you to find out for yourself what you really, with all your

heart, love to do.... Then you are really efficient, without becoming brutal." This provides inspiration, as Patanjali (1989) has called it. To define themselves authentically, children (and adults) must listen not only to the voices of parent and teacher and text, but especially to those of their own hearts, their own inner voice.

The educator's role includes helping to find the song that sings in the student and helping him or her learn to sing it. This may come through questions in the spirit of "Who are you?" "What have you come to learn and to teach?" "What is your offering, your gift, your work?" and foremost: "What do you love?" Instead, we often do not ask and so the child has trouble knowing what to ask himself or herself. Mostly we say, "Here is what you are to know; it is the truth; be prepared to be tested on it." With such an orientation, one's own knowing is, at best, subordinate to prepackaged knowledge; at its worst, it is entirely dismissed. This squelches spontaneous and intuitive response to experience and thereby squelches the person, demanding that the person define himself or herself inauthentically, off center. The *Gospel According to St. Thomas* warns us that the consequences of this are dire:

> If you bring forth what is within you, what you bring forth will save you. If you do not bring forth what is within you, what you do not bring forth will destroy you. (in Pagels 1979, 126)

However, when our insides are welcomed, the educational orientation changes: "Here is what you need to join the dance of culture; here are some tools. Now what will you bring to the dance? What questions and knowing have you to add?"

Asking what we think or feel about something is the same as asking who we are. When students share perspectives with one another, they have an opportunity to see who they are in relation to others. Self-reflection can be evoked very simply, as when we ask eighth-graders to draw and/or write about what they are like on the inside and what they are like on the outside. In addition, our values reflect our interiors. So questions such as "What would you die for?" "What would you have done if you were in the situation offered by today's lesson?" "What would your hero have done?" provide a chance for values to rise to the surface. A simple exercise such as "Sit quietly, write down five adjectives or words that describe you, share one at a time with a partner including explanations" sets a tone of self-reflection, community, and intimacy in a class. We can add another level of reflection in the same exercise by asking, "What feelings and thoughts popped up during the exercise?" "How much did you hold back?" "How risky or honest were you?" "How has your impression or sense of the person you spoke with changed due to your conversation?" I sometimes ask class members to write a poem that is intended to hint at some class lesson or experience, or write a Haiku that captures an instant of existence. And nearly always, for every age, drawing or any of the other arts are direct routes to express the inner life, giving the artist and the observer something tangible, a point of contact, to meet over.

Asking about who we are can also come from asking what we hate, fear, or love in another person. We project our shadow, those aspects that we have not incorporated or owned, onto others. These are often revealed by our strong feelings or abject avoidance toward someone or something. When we fall deeply in love, we may be recognizing part of our shadow and projecting it on the other person. As Robert Johnson (1998) says, we unconsciously ask the other person to hold our "alchemical gold," those special and sacred parts that we have trouble owning within ourselves. We may also demonize another to hold those "negative" parts that we cannot own.

Wisdom can involve insight and epiphany, as James Joyce called it. One student described a moment of epiphany brought forth through a teacher's simple and genuine question:

> My teacher asked me what I thought, what was important to me; he actually thought this was important, that I was important. And after years of getting the message that what they thought was all that was important … I began to trust and listen to myself. It was like being reintroduced to someone I forgot was there all along.

Perceiving that another person values us, sets off a profound ripple through our being, one that invites us to encounter ourselves more deeply.

Our youngest students gain self-knowledge especially through their free play or experimentation

with the world. Froebel (1887, 55), the creator of the kindergarten, emphasized that play is the "self-active representation of the inner [nature]." For Froebel the purpose of the kindergarten is not to give the child a head start in information acquisition, although it has sometimes been co-opted to serve just this end. Instead, experimentation and play is an opportunity to bring out the inner nature, helping the student find and define himself or herself accordingly. Without sufficient free space, especially psychological space, it becomes difficult to play out our inner natures. Without such experimentation, the self tends to be overly shaped from the outside, rather than drawn forth from within. Play and experimentation may reveal a sense of one's character and calling. Hillman (1996) takes up this question of calling in his exploration of the lives of many famous individuals, from Ella Fitzgerald to Eleanor Roosevelt, who seemed to demonstrate their calling from a very early age. Their genius or daimon pushed itself into embodiment. In this sense, "growing up" is actually better described as "growing down," bringing one's calling and character into the world. So self-discovery and definition are not merely a task of adolescence and adulthood, but they begin with the play of the youngest and extend to every age and level, even (and maybe especially) to the teacher. What is our calling as teachers? How do we define ourselves authentically and spontaneously?

Self-knowledge thrives when we are invited to listen to ourselves. When I was a first semester graduate student, I walked into my professor's office one day. The professor's name was Gunner and at some level I expected my ideas to be gunned down. I was sharing some half-baked idea and instead of correcting me or saying "Yes, but" he seemed to listen deeply and really try to understand what I meant. He asked probing but not attacking questions, reflected back his understanding, and shared some of his own ideas, not in a correction but in a mutual dialogue. I began to see my ideas in a new, less defensive way; even more significantly, I saw myself differently. I cannot fully describe the impact this has had on my life. I felt like a new person; I was heard and validated. All those years of trying to conform to someone else's "right answer" or way of being had been internalized into a very loud self-critic who drowned my own knowing to the point at which I did not trust or listen to myself. Previously, most of my schooling had been drudgery. After this conversation, my motivation exploded; something was freed in that moment. I remember reading more in the one course I had with him that semester than I had in my previous four years of college—and I loved it.

As I became a therapist and a teacher I discovered that this moment in Gunner's office shaped my approach to working with others probably more than any other event. Specifically, I saw my most sacred task as opening and holding a space for myself and the other to meet in. When we genuinely invite the other's perspective and establish a trusting and respectful relationship, a space is created. Even the space that is created by the configuration of our classroom furniture may symbolize openings and limits, private and public spaces, and direct the flow in one way or another.

Some time later, I discovered that a similar revelation had occurred in Gunner's own education many years earlier. As a high school student, he was a troubled, talented underachiever who, along with a group of peers, was periodically taken by bus to visit the nearby Princeton University campus for presentations by distinguished physicists of the day, Einstein among them. One day, after a long, dry talk by one of the physicists, a young girl raised her hand and wryly asked these men of science what they thought of ghosts. Two of the physicists quickly and precisely dismissed the possibility, citing a lack of hard scientific evidence. When they were finished, Robert Oppenheimer, who was instrumental in the development of the atomic bomb and later a staunch critic of its use, paused and offered a different response. He said, "That's a fascinating question. I accept the possibility of all things," and suggested that "it is necessary to find one's own required evidence" before accepting or rejecting a possibility. For Gunner, this was a revelation. Instead of closing down and accepting the world as prepackaged, Oppenheimer's perspective opened it back up to mystery, to the possibility of all things, and to one's responsibility to discover it for oneself. Gunner's "way of being" began to shift as he came to define himself from the center of his own direct experience. More than fifty years later, he remembers Oppenheimer's re-

sponse as clearly as I remember Gunner's generous and genuine reply to me in his office some twenty years ago. Since then I think have tried to stay open and honor mystery and possibility, listen, and seek my own required evidence. Essentially, these encounters opened us simultaneously to the depths of ourselves and the world.

By the way, this is often how teaching goes: We pay back and pass along the gifts given to us mostly by living them out honorably, wisely. For all of us who teach in one form or another, who were those teachers (formal or informal) who made a difference? What were those moments that opened the world up? What do we still hold dear from those epiphanies? And how well do we live and teach from the heart of those lessons learned?

Dancing with Authority

Defining oneself authentically involves rejecting authority. On the surface this, of course, appears to be a basic threat to the teacher, text, and the assistant principal. This is not to be misunderstood as thwarting the basic rules of community, established for safety, efficiency, and harmony. Instead, it means turning inward to rely on our own knowing rather than on someone else's. Remember Oppenheimer's invocation to Gunner: "Find your own required evidence." He said essentially, "Do not rely on these experts before you to find your truth. Use them, but find it yourself." This does not discard theories and experts, information, and ideology; instead it dialogues them. The locus of evaluation moves inward, toward our center. It is easier to make the case for this internal movement with older students, but I suggest that we develop the capacity for ethical and intelligent choices and wise action when we ask students at every age to overcome the intimidation of authority in order to dialogue and dance with it.

There have been meaningful challenges to institutionalized authority. We have come to recognize the disproportional influences of power-knowledge-economic-discursive amalgams on our ideas (e.g., Foucault 1980). Yet in education, we have not overcome the habit of looking primarily outside for authority, to the teachers, texts, sciences, leaders, and so forth. Unless children are weaned from this suckling on external authority, their internal decision making and skills of discernment do not mature. We teach obedience at the cost of insight and wisdom. "Being as little children" (the Christian requirement for entering Christ Consciousness, a wisdom space) comes to mean compliance rather than openness to experience. When educational practice perpetuates this over-dependence on external authority, students (and teachers) remain developmentally delayed in their abilities to form ethical choices, evaluate information, and understand themselves. The evaluative capacity becomes undernourished from lack of stimulation and practice; and instead of developing a capacity for discernment, we may become skilled at imposing beliefs or judgments on others because this is what has been modeled for us.

A culprit in our contemporary moral difficulties is not the lack of moral guidance (good ideas abound; God is in the bookstore) or the over-stimulation of the information age. Instead, It is, in part, our habit of relying on external moral or intellectual authority, which has caused us to retard our children's skill in actively discerning value and virtue. The flood of options and images, diversity and dialogue, that comes with the postmodern era has not caused this difficulty but has exposed our weakness. Some have tried to stop the world by anchoring themselves in some doctrinal solutions and imposing layers of doctrine and rules upon others. Such solutions provide, at best, a moral sunscreen, a superficial response, but one that does not address the underlying difficulty, the cause of the hole in the moral ozone.

It is ironic that in a society that prizes democratic values and self-determination, we have not developed a democratic-experiential approach to values in schools. The calls from our leaders are most often for imperialistic solutions driven by fear (and sometimes mere political opportunism) instead of insight. The imposition of Truth becomes an act of imperialism that, in time, breeds repression and revolution of one sort or another. It is not that the information is damaging, it is just that it inevitably incomplete and its imposition as truth or fact is oppressive. We practice authenticity through changing the way we make choices. Teaching a people how to make centered choices, like teaching people to fish instead of just giving them fish, makes ethical decision making an ongoing growth process. When we rely on the au-

thority of some form, theory, or person, we give away the intimate experience and responsibility of choosing. When we are forced to swallow ideas whole, without question, we end up doing just that, or spitting them out entirely. When this occurs, the rift between the "moral" and the "amoral," us and them, the smart and the dumb, the obedient and the troublemakers, will grow wider.

Since the 1930s, Alfred Korzybski's dictum, "The map is not the territory," has cautioned us about relying on "maps" by themselves. However, as our ability to make all kinds of maps improved and our faith in an objective, scientifically knowable world grew, we came to rely increasingly on maps or theories as our guiding truths and became less inclined to create our own views through direct experience. The concept or map was elevated from its position as mediator or representation of experience, to the experience itself. We became enamored with our concepts and discounted direct experience, and in so doing lost the sensitivity to and trust in experience as a valid way of knowing.

As the process of reliance on external authority becomes personally internalized, it takes the form of a dependence on theories or doctrine as opposed to dynamic experience, accepting the authority of form rather than the authority of experience. We learn to look for one right answer rather than to ask good questions; and we develop a habit of attaching ourselves to and depending on theories or externally generated forms that then shape our perceptions and experiences. The trouble comes when we replace our openness to experience with these maps or theories, falling to encounter the other in a way that keeps our maps open-ended and dynamic. Contact with the other is instead used to reinforce our theory, and "dogmatism ensues where hypothesis hardens into ideology" (Thurman 1991, 59). When our theory becomes preeminent, we lose the chance to experience diversity and consequently prejudge individuals and ideas.

Meacham (1990, 181) suggests that the most significant feature of wisdom is "to hold an attitude that knowledge is fallible and to strive for a balance between knowing and doubting." We help students find their own wisdom by helping them develop the art of dialoguing with authority. This can be approached through a balance of critical analysis and radical openness. Critical analysis and questioning accepts nothing at face value. Its starting point is a kind of rejection of the surface proposition. This allows us to bounce perspectives around to see how they respond. The opposite and balance to critical questioning is what W. B. Yeats called "radical innocence." At times, in order to really understand the other (i.e., idea, person), we may need to suspend our disbelief, take a leap of faith, and uncritically steep ourselves in the other. This is the Beginner's Mind of Zen Buddhism and the instruction from Jesus that one must be as little children in order to enter the Kingdom.

But neither radical openness nor critical analysis is a final resting place for wisdom: "Truth" is worked out in the dialogue between them. As we hold the tension of that dialectic often another way of seeing emerges. Judgment is the skilled use of the analytic mind to evaluate the relative merits of one thing over another. It draws largely from analysis of the present situation in light of past experiences. As valuable as this is, it remains only a partial way of knowing. Another "eye" of knowing comes more directly and quietly. The sages and mystics described it as an inner knowing, inner voice, inner guidance, the contemplative eye as St. Bonaventure called it (Wilber 1989). Discernment involves a shift from being guided primarily by logical analysis of past experiences and by one's senses to allowing "inner guidance" to enter the dialogue. Discernment uses analysis but also includes this inner, more intuitive source. This goes beyond categories and systems of thinking to take into account the dynamic morality of the heart.

MindScience

Henry David Thoreau said that he would give first prize to the person who could live one day deliberately. Living deliberately means being "so centered that one becomes ultimately fascinated, ravished, and overwhelmed by the mystery that permeates and suffuses all nature, all people, all reality" (McNamara 1990, 108). Thoreau's offer suggests how difficult such living really is. The deliberateness he refers to implies moving beyond habits of thought, perception, and deed to be fully centered and awake

throughout the day. Education for wisdom is not about simply being taught but about *waking up*. Waking up requires a certain kind of energy, certain capacities for taking the world into our consciousness: "Wisdom is not the product of mental effort. Wisdom is a state of the total being" (Richards 1989, 15).

The dominant Western approach to knowledge for the last several hundred years has been largely a quest for control, predictability, and comprehension of the external and material worlds, from the atom to the atmosphere. But for some, the quest for knowledge went internal and delved into consciousness (i.e., exploring subjective experience). These researchers have developed maps and "inner technologies," what the Dalai Lama calls "MindScience," a technology for using the mind rather than being driven by it (see Goleman and Thurman 1991). Through such approaches, we come to possess our thoughts, rather than being possessed by them.

Wisdom is cultivated by learning to use the mind rather than being used by it. Feelings fluctuate, passions rise and fall, moods come and go, thoughts flow in and out. The challenge is not to be overwhelmed or distracted but to recognize the inevitable fluctuations of the mind and to develop the capacity for self-discipline (not reacting to every impulse) and self-mastery (intentionally directing or opening to states of mind such as focusing attention or relaxing). This develops first and foremost by witnessing the contents of consciousness: self-awareness. The process of awareness "begin[s] to sense and interrupt automatic patterns of conditioned thinking, sensation and behavior" (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1993, 122):

> The practices involved in the development of mindfulness/awareness are virtually never described as the training of meditative virtuosity (and certainly not as the development of a higher, more evolved spirituality) but rather as the letting go of habits of mindlessness, as an unlearning rather than a learning. (p. 29)

This involves "keeping one's consciousness alive to the present reality" (Nhat Hanh 1975, 11). This is accomplished by what Tich Nhat Hanh calls "pure recognition," which is recognition without judgment. That is, we can welcome equally all thoughts and feelings that arise by simply recognizing the presence of these things without judgment or attempts to chase them away. The result does not disengage the mind from the world; it enables the mind to be more present within the world. The point is "not to avoid action but to become fully present in one's action" (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1993, 122). In addition, we do not replace the receding ground of the environment with the ground of the mind. That is, cognition is not reduced to being molded and shaped by an independent environment or to merely the internal generation of mind; it is instead the result of interaction, "enacted" in a dialogue, a constant interplay that does not posit an absolute ground in either the environment or the self.

As awareness develops, something else happens. The new degree of openness to experience not only encompasses one's own immediate sphere of perception but also enables one to appreciate others. An open heart, awareness of suffering, and deep compassion are regularly described as arising naturally out of the process. As we simply and honestly observe and tolerate our own reactions, we may also gain a tolerance for others. Gebser (1991, 531) says, "Anyone with a sense of detachment from himself also gains a detachment from the world, including a sense of tolerance." This is not a distant kind of objectivism but is instead a witnessing presence, one that Meister Eckhart (1958) also refers to as "detachment."

There is a Sikh chant consisting of these lines: "I am here. Let me be fully here." Such presence is encouraged when we simply welcome and witness our being. When we fight or resist part of us, we spend time suffering and struggling to keep our self at bay. Tarthang Tulku (1977) describes the practice of being "relentlessly honest" with ourselves as the basis of bringing our center to the here and now. M. C. Richards (1989, 36) reminds us that this act of awareness toward wisdom is not one of exclusion but of inclusion.

> We are transformed, not by adopting attitudes toward ourselves but by bringing into center all the elements of our sensation and our thinking and our emotions and our will: all the realities of our bodies and our souls. All the dark void in us of our undiscovered selves, all the small light of our discovered being. All the drive of our

> hungers, and our fairest and blackest dreams. All, all the elements come into center, into union with all other elements. And in such a state they become quite different in function than when they are separated and segregated and discriminated between or against.

The actual activity of awareness is quite simple. One simply calms and quiets the mind (this is why anything from vacations to prayer, jogging to meditation, art to journal writing serves as a way in); we may notice our own breath rising and falling and then simply witness the activity generated by the mind. In and of itself, this practice develops "witness consciousness." As we become mindful, we are able "to experience what one's mind is doing as it does it, to be present with one's mind" (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1993, 23). We might notice where in our minds, for example, the roots that a choice may stem from (e.g., longing, grasping, insecurity, fear, etc.) and untangle our choices from those roots so they may be more fully conscious and more fully ours. And while the young child may not have the ability to conceptualize these roots precisely, he or she does have the capacity to develop the skills of awareness that can grow into transparency. When we ask the child to identify a feeling or to find the location of a feeling or thought in his or her body, or simply to relax and allow the mind to wander and describe the content of the journey, we are fostering awareness. This is the place that sees how upset we are or how much we enjoyed something or simply notices the stream of our thoughts.

Eugene Gendlin's (1988) focusing technique is another method for cultivating the witnessing awareness. Very briefly, his fundamental exercise begins by asking us to create a "space" and bring our awareness to our body in order to locate a "felt sense" of an issue or concern. We might ask "What is the thing for me right now?" Rather than entering into it, we are to stand back from this "thing" in order to get a sense of what all of the problem feels like. Then we are to find a "quality-word" (e.g., sticky, murky, hard) and go back and forth between the word or image, and our felt sense of it; we are looking for a fit, and allowing either the word or the felt sense to change in order to find the best fit. Then we might ask: "What makes this problem so sticky, hard, or whatever one's quality-word is?" Finally, we are invited to receive whatever comes our way, allowing our awareness to stay present. These simple instructions provide an effective way to practice awareness.

Developing awareness through meditation, journaling, contemplation, prayer, focusing, or other means allows us to witness the contents of our consciousness. This provides power to recognize and interrupt habitual patterns of mind and action. Ultimately, it enables us to be more fully present in the world and present to our heart.

The Heart of Understanding

Finally and perhaps foremost, wisdom is cultivated as we nourish the heart. As mentioned previously, the wisdom traditions locate the most essential knowing not in the head but in the heart. Caring and understanding are seen as part of the foundation for wise action. This is the revelation of Jesus' love and Buddha's compassion. Teilhard de Chardin (1975, 86-87) hints at the power of the awakened heart.

> The day will come when, after harnessing the ether, the winds, the waves, the tides, gravitation, we shall harness for God the energies of love. And, on that day, for the second time in the history of the world, man will have discovered fire.

The fire of the heart (compassion and love) does propel us beyond mere self-interest into concerns of depth and meaning, social justice and caring—a life of the soul. The great Indian poet Rabindranath Tagore (1961, 57) tells us that "love is freedom: it gives us that fullness of existence which saves us from paying with our soul for objects that are immensely cheap." This fullness of existence does not come only from a "great act" on the scale of, say, a Ghandi or Mother Theresa. All expressions of love are maximal, from caring for the classroom bunny, to helping a fellow student at a nearby desk. An ethic of caring, collaboration, and community (to complement playful competition) fosters attitudes of concern for one another in a classroom.

The way we know effects what we see. As Antoine de Saint-Exupery's (1971, 87) Little Prince tells us "And now here is my secret, a very simple secret: it is only with the heart that one can see right; what is es-

sential is invisible to the eye." Seeing through the heart requires a fundamental shift in the way curriculum is typically offered in schools. While conventional schooling is often dominated by assumptions of objectivism (see Hart 2001), a more intimate meeting based on a principle of understanding (which literally means to stand among as opposed to apart from) is required. As Buber (1958, 11) says, "all real living is meeting," and understanding of the sort I am describing comes in the activity of meeting. Buber describes this shift as a movement from an "I-It" relationship" toward one of "I and Thou." Understanding comes when we empathize with the other, lean into the other, and suspend our distant self-separateness for a moment. As we do so, a recognition of interconnection may emerge. And when we see ourselves as interconnected, it is much more difficult to perpetrate violence upon the other (whether a person or the natural world). This empathic meeting has been described as the basis of moral development (Hoffman 1990), and it may even be the trait that makes us most human (Azar 1997).

This way of knowing is as useful in science as it is in human relationships. Nobel laureate Barbara McClintock described a less detached empiricism, one in which she gained "a feeling for the organism." In her explorations of genetics through her work with corn plants, she described the fundamental relationship as one of "openness to let it come to you" (in Keller 1983, 198). The other is no longer separate but becomes part of our world and ourselves in a profoundly intimate way.

The heart of understanding is cultivated through empathy, appreciation, openness, accommodation, service, listening, and loving presence. At its core, heartfulness involves a quite literal shift in our being. In the midst of a conflict or frustration, in the middle of a hurried day, or as a regular "tune-in," most of us can get a taste of our heart by simply sitting quietly for a few minutes, taking a deep breath, and gently bringing awareness to the area of the chest. There is often a felt shift involving a sense of tenderness, spaciousness, slowing down, and settling in. Taking a few moments during the busy day to help students "breathe into their hearts" provides a practice of slowing down and opening that wisdom space within.

In a classroom a simple attitude of appreciation and an attempt at understanding or meeting the other on its own terms can serve as another practice of heartfulness. This requires a suspension of manipulation, of trying to get something out of it, and of pre-judgment. This may even lead to a sense of awe. Heschel (1972, 75, 74) writes,

> Awe enables us to perceive in the world intimations of the divine, to sense in small things the beginning of infinite significance, to sense the ultimate in the common and the simple; to feel the rush of the passing of the stillness of the eternal…. The beginning of awe is wonder, and the beginning of wisdom is awe.

One very direct way to experiment with empathy and understanding is through service. Service is important not just to fill the needs of the culture, or because it is the moral or good thing to do, but because it actually opens our consciousness, our ways of knowing. Service is a way of knowing our connection with a reality much larger than ourselves (see Deikman 2000). Often our own heart opens through freely given service.

When a child takes the classroom bunny home for the weekend, it is primarily a lesson in service and responsibility to the bunny and to the class. When young children have plants to care for, they are learning the lessons of service to the community of nature. When an older student helps a younger one, a bond is usually formed as the two come into relationship with one another and then with the material at hand. A sense of pleasure and pride in the accomplishments of one another often emerge if the meeting deepens. This relationship develops between students of any ages. Third-graders help out in the kindergarten; eleventh-graders help with eight-grade math; many of my university students volunteer as tutors throughout the primary and secondary grades.

Assisting one another inside and outside the classroom develops the principle of "leaving no one out." This is an experiential curriculum of social justice, one in which *understanding* and shared responsibility guides decisions about human affairs. This fosters an ecology of interconnection and a practice of compassion.

Understanding is an inclusive activity. When we understand, it is difficult to marginalize or otherwise exclude the other. In a classroom and in a school, children quickly notice who is on the outside and who is on the inside. Friendships develop, cliques form, and some students become outcasts because of their ability, their attitudes, their actions, their looks or family, or intangibles that are harder to name (e.g., cooties). Marginalization and scapegoating serve a purpose with Social Darwinism as the backdrop. They reduce our own anxiety and allow us to demonize the other in order to make ourselves feel more right and righteous, or at least part of the in-group. Can we develop a classroom culture in which no one is left out or left behind academically or otherwise, one in which we share responsibility for the members of our group, in which the *modus operandi* is something other than Social Darwinism? If we cannot do this in the classroom, we most certainly cannot expect to do it in the world outside.

When we center on understanding, our attitudes and actions achieve an organizing principle that transcends purely individual accomplishment and recognition as the goal. Community, cooperation, and even communion can join with appropriate competition and necessary individuality.

And ultimately, as teachers and administrators, we teach who we are. If we demonstrate compassion and love, and our ability to meet one another and our lessons with appreciation, we help children cultivate their own heart and ultimately their own wisdom.

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Dewey and the Romanticism of Holistic Education

Geoff Taggart

The particular spiritual neo-Romantic orientation of holistic education appears to account for its inconsistency in becoming more engaged with injustice. This strain of Romanticism can be contrasted with that found in the work of John Dewey who, by contrast, was romantic in his passion for democracy and community.

Charles Taylor (1989), in his analysis of romanticism, sees a key element as "millenarism" or utopianism, the sense of being poised at a moment of crisis, on the cusp of a new age. Romanticism expressed this sense that the neo-classical view of society with its fixed, hierarchical relations was coming to an end. The neo-classical view is architectural and static with the most noble sections of society at the top. By the end of the eighteenth century, however, it was clear from world events that change did not necessarily happen in an orderly, stately manner. Revolutions in America and France provided incontrovertible proof that change could be dynamic, explosive, and expressive. Although the new age foreseen by Enlightenment humanists was benevolent and humanitarian, the richer, more polarized language of Rousseau, centered on virtue and vice, freedom and tyranny, characterised its passion and vibrancy. There was a trust in the innate goodness of people, which was evident in the hope expressed for a better age once tyranny and corruption were swept aside.

Dewey has a similarly visionary and romantic idea of community that is rooted in the American faith in the power of communication to achieve consensus. Dewey's thought takes democracy beyond its usual association with parliamentary government and suggests that social cohesion rests in grassroots participation. Community, for him, is a forum through which people can uncover the principles that have informed its habits and make pragmatic adjustments for mutual advantage. Pluralism and diversity are desirable attributes for a community for "unity cannot be a homogenous thing," but efforts have to be directed at a democratic unity "by drawing out and composing into a harmonious whole the best, the most characteristic which each each contributing race and people have to offer" (MW 10: 204).

Note: References to Dewey's works cited as LW (Late Works) and MW (Middle Works) refer to Boydston's (1969-1991) *Collected Works of John Dewey*.

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Dewey's romantic social vision is based on the moral belief that everyone has received unearned benefits from the prior efforts of the human community that have to be repaid. Democracy is a kind of *meliorism*, an activity with an unseen end but which is informed by faith in humanity. It is a romantic ideal "for it is an end that has not been adequately realised in any country at any time" (LW 11, 229). It was the same visionary, romantic view of change that inspired Marx.

As Taylor points out (1989, 496), it is possible to see the student radicalism of the 1960s as a romantic movement as much as a Marxian one. "In some respects, " he argues,

> the actual goals which inspired the students' revolt of May 1968 in Paris, for the borrowing of modernist forms from Situationism, Dada, Surrealism, avant-grade cinema, and the like, were closer to Schiller than to any twentieth century writer. The picture of a restored harmony within the person and between people as a result of "decloisonnement," the breaking down of barriers between art and life, work and love, class and class, and the image of this harmony as a fuller freedom—all this fits well within original Romantic aspirations.

Another feature of romanticism was its reaction against a reductive and mechanistic view of nature and mind. In Enlightenment thought, mind was thought of either as a *tabula rasa*, written on by sensory impressions, or the solitary source of truth in a dead universe. Newton argued that nature was made up of colliding particles with no internal life of their own. Romanticism proposed an alternative worldview. For Coleridge, for example, mind was active and constructive in the world, the "primary imagination" instinctively and unconsciously putting the world together in a way that makes sense for us. This opens the way for "secondary imagination," a higher order faculty, the mark of the artist, which forges new images and symbols. Nature is similarly alive and active. The philosophies of nature proposed by Hilderlin, Schelling, and Novalis suggest that there is a common energetic current in all life which unites human beings and nature. Human beings are, in fact, the evolutionary end-product of nature blossoming into self-consciousness.

Dewey similarly proposes a participatory epistemology. He is vehement that "since the seventeenth century, this conception of experience as the equivalent of subjective private consciousness set over against nature, which consists wholly of physical objects, has wrought havoc in philosophy" (LW 1, 11) He maintains that "we cannot separate organic life and mind from physical nature without also separating nature from life and mind. The separation has reached a point where intelligent persons are asking whether the end is to be catastrophe, the subjection of man to the industrial and military machines he has created" (LW 1, 296). Anticipating later ecological thought, Dewey proposed to re-unite nature and humanity by reformulating mind as a sociocultural force that mediates between the two. He sets himself against philosophical extremes, arguing that while thoughts may not be original and primary, as Descartes proposed, neither is the mind some kind of mailbox through which sensory impressions are posted. He dismisses all Cartesian attempts to give the results of reflection a reality superior to that of the phenomenon itself. For him, the objects of the world "are things *had* before they are things cognised" (LW 1, 21). He is convinced that "cognitive experience must originate within that of a non-cognitive sort" (LW 1, 23). He is similarly dismissive of attempts by behaviorists to give primacy to the environment and to reduce mind to a programmed machine. Dewey's entire philosophy is centered around the very real desires and intentions of human beings to engage with their environment, to make tools, to construct languages, and form societies. For him, just as with Hegel and Schelling, mind is *emergent*, "an added property assumed by a feeling creature when it reaches that organized interaction with other living creatures which is language, communication" (LW 1, 258).

However, there is a central element of Romanticism for which Dewey had little sympathy. According to Taylor (1989), this is a philosophy of "expressivism," the idea that we can express this unitive, emergent mind by finding the truth within us. Kant had already laid the groundwork for Romanticism by arguing that morality is inherent within consciousness itself rather than built into the natural order. Within expressivism, however, the means of

finding truth was to be feelings rather than thoughts. Passion, intensity, and honoring one's own interior life were paramount. Rousseau, for example, argued that civilization corrodes one's unique sense of individuality and lessens one's power to act with passion, vitality, and originality. The importance of self-determination was shown in Herder's claim that life-forms grow towards completeness, not because of their place within the natural order, but because each is propelled by its own inner sense of purpose. The metaphor of the seed developing according to its own internal blueprint was therefore a popular image. Fulfilling this inner nature meant expressing this inner elan, voice, or impulse, and this gave an important role to the arts. The romantic archetype of the artist we have today is due to the self-image of poets like Keats and Shelley, who saw themselves as passionate, sensitive, introspective souls who could reveal this nature and penetrate the human condition the most deeply. For them, their poetry was the visible expression of more primal thoughts and feelings within the kernel of the self.

The individualism within this particular aspect of the romantic legacy is anathema to Dewey. He considered that romanticism had "created a vast and somnabulistic egotism out of the fact of subjectivity" (LW 1, 243). It had completely overlooked the social origins of cultural life, the intersubjective nature of language and the communal instincts of human beings. Nevertheless, as I shall argue, it is this aspect of romanticism which represents a source of inspiration to holistic educators.

As Miller (1990) describes it, the American interpretation of Romanticism, namely the transcendentalism of Emerson and Thoreau, provides a powerful resource for contemporary holistic education. Dewey, however, would find little in common with it. In transcendentalism, for example, the individual "has a value, not as belonging to a community, and contributing to a general good which is distinct from himself, but on his own account" (Channing, quoted in Miller 1990, 84). Emerson, in particular, combines rugged individualism with a thorough-going Platonism. As I will argue, the spirituality of transcendentalism which infuses holistic education seems to be individualist rather than social and ethereal rather than material.

Holistic Education, New Age, and Transcendentalism

The transcendentalist legacy is most obvious in the use of the term "soul." In his latest work, John Miller (2000), in defining the relevance of soul for holistic education, makes an explicit connection between Emerson and contemporary efforts to rediscover the spiritual in everyday life (Moore 1992; Sardello 1995). Yet this spirituality is rarely conveyed as being material, social, or public. Despite his assertion that "contemplation and soulful knowing are characterised by non-duality," Miller (2000, 28) espouses a very dualistic and Cartesian sort of spirituality in which inner value is contrasted with outer fact and mundane matter with elevated spirit. Emerson's definition of soul, which he includes, is the famous paragraph (1982/1841, 207) where it is argued that

> the soul in man is not an organ, but animates and exercises all the organs;… [it] is the background of our being, in which they lie—an immensity not possessed and that cannot be possessed.

The essence of spirituality is therefore non-material. At the climax of the same essay, Emerson reveals his philosophical roots: "I am somehow receptive of the great soul, and thereby I do overlook the sun and the stars and feel them to be the fair accidents and effects which change and pass" (1982/1841, 224).

Emerson is wholeheartedly neo-Platonist. In neo-Platonist thought, the sun and the stars are passing and therefore imperfect compared with the world of pure and timeless Forms existing behind and beyond the mundane world of phenomena. The divine light streams from the superabundance of the perfect realm and fades as it becomes progressively entangled with the material plane. This plane is devoid of spiritual reality and in order to recover our spiritual roots we need to overcome the hindrances of the flesh and attain mystical illumination. The spiritual is projected onto the plane of the timeless, unworldly and transcendent and can only be recovered through exploration of ones own interior depth. It is difficult to understand how, in this case, the natural world can be valuable in and of itself if it is simply the first step on the ladder to a higher and truer reality.

We can see how this gnostic romanticism has led to the postmodern culture we live in today. Romantic poets and artists always felt that it was through listening to the voice within themselves that they accomplished their work; the consensual world was simply raw material for the artistic sensiblity to work on. It is a short step from this to denying that there is a consensual world at all and that each of us constructs a semblance of reality out of our kitbag of experiences and theories. The New Age movement, a typically postmodern development, heightens and intensifies the existing tendencies of romanticism towards both individualism and gnosticism. We can look at each of them in turn.

From the 1960s, the individualism of the dawning New Age movement was clearly established by the new school of humanistic psychology. As Sutcliffe (1995, 2) makes clear, this is a quintessentially American phenomenon in that it "is largely premissed upon a rejection of historical determinism in favor of a rhetoric of limitless potentiality for the individual seeking a fortune—of whatever kind—in the fluid, migrant culture typical of twentieth century North America." This view is reinforced by Heelas (1996, 154) who remarks that

> in the context of our culture, it is impossible to think of a self which is more autonomous or free, more in control or powerful, more responsible, more perfect, more internalised, more expressivistic (sic) than that presented in various New Age discourses.

Similarly in humanistic psychology, authenticity, creativity, and personal growth are all values that rely on complete individual freedom and self-determination.

The gnosticism of New Age spirituality is shown in the common idea that consensual reality is transitory and shifting and that the only thing that is of ultimate, ontological value is knowledge, represented by ones' beliefs. The popular author Wayne Dyer, for example, entitles one of his books, *You'll See it When You Believe It* and a New Age interpreter of science affirms that "reality is what we take to be true" (Zukav 1980). In such thinking, since people have chosen the reality they experience, it is important for them to "work through" the consequences of it in order to learn how to change it. People in less fortunate circumstances are simply having to learn valuable lessons.

These two elements, individualism and gnosticism, come together to legitimize a spirituality of personal empowerment and self-reliance. Although Emerson could not have foreseen how a non-institutional and de-traditionalised "seminar spirituality" would emerge to cater to exactly his kind of lifestyle, it is clear that his doctrine of "self-reliance" provides it with cultural legitimacy. This "seminar spirituality," based on the view that the individual alone has ontological reality, is aimed at maximizing one's "abundance" and "prosperity" and therefore takes an uncritical view of capitalism and commodity fetishism. While there are movements that see detachment from consumerism as the ideal, the movements that have had the most impact upon modernity have, by their very nature, been those that seek to promote personal empowerment and authenticity by embracing the American dream. The "mind, body, spirit" field of publishing has mushroomed over recent years, with many books that unite mysticism with the positive thinking of Norman Vincent Peale and the self-improvement doctrine of Horatio Alger (e.g., Dyer 1998). There is a consistent belief in an entitlement to personal wealth and a view that "being wealthy is a function of enlightenment" (Orr and Ray 1983). Spirituality, as the sum total of private and unconscious desires, has become aligned with the goal of self-actualization within the commodified life of late modernity.

Furthermore, although politically counter-cultural, New Age culture has proved increasingly attractive to the politics of the right. As Ron Miller (2000) has recently shown, the neo-liberal ideology of freedom and the counter-cultural ideology of freedom are not easily distinguished and can easily merge. This can be shown historically in that the power of the individual to bring about change, unencumbered by bureaucratic tradition, was as much Reagan's creed as Emerson's. Indeed, over the course of the 1980s, the counter-cultural desire to be free of the past, the ego, and the constraints of "straight" society transmogrified into a neo-liberal prosperity gospel. Personal resourcefulness and self-reliance were key virtues and Emerson's tract of that name could have provided a key text : "And truly it

demands something godlike in him who has cast off the common motives of humanity and has ventured to trust himself for a taskmaster" (Emerson 1982/ 1841, 194).

This relationship between New Age spirituality and business makes sense when one looks at Romantic postmodernism from an economic point of view. As various commentators have pointed out (e.g., Harvey 1990; Jameson 1991), the culture of postmodernism is a logical reflection of recent changes in the industrial process, one that can be characterised as a switch from a Fordist mode of capitalism, which had little concern for creativity in the production process, to a post-Fordist one, which values creativity and intuition as necessary for maintaining competitiveness. Enterprise culture has, in the process, swallowed up counter-culture. In recent times, the New Age prosperity gospel has certainly proved attractive to multinational corporations. The followers of Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh, for example, have run "results seminars" for IBM and the "breakthrough" program of the Guinness corporation is derived from EST, a popular psychotherapeutic training from the 1970s. Spirituality is consistently presented as consonant with maximizing one's own resourcefulness and making profits. While, in biblical theology, those who worship money have fatally misplaced their allegiance, in New Age culture, money becomes spiritualized. According to theologian and religious educator John Hull (1996a; 1996b), this occurs because of the deep parallels between God and money which global capitalism accentuates. It becomes possible to talk of a "spirituality of money."

Hull and the Spirituality of Money

The idea of the "spirituality of money" would seem at first glance to be an oxymoron, yet this is simply because the two concepts of spirituality and money are often falsely contrasted. God has been seen as having nothing to do with mere economics and money has been seen as having nothing to do with ultimate, spiritual concerns. Instead, Hull argues that money is like God in two key respects. First, it is unique among all other things and it is also purely symbolic. A coin has no intrinsic value, as those caught within spiralling inflation have find out. It is also a source of powerful longing: "Money is the outstanding fetish of our society, and like all fetishes it manifests a concentrated erotic or numinous power" (1996b, 287). According to the Enlightenment thought of Adam Smith, money is simply a worldly, unspiritual, and neutral feature of the economy, designed so that "rational man" can extract maximum advantage in exchange for his work. However, money can be seen as the source of spirituality insofar as it determines relationships, controls the imagination and desire, and acts as a spur to development. If we consider that what we take to be of ultimate worth is necessarily one's religion, then the spirituality of money is indeed a contemporary reality. If we see money as simply utilitarian, then the effect of money in creating a web of ideals, symbols and desires, working on an unconscious and spiritual level, will be repressed or ignored.

Another reason why "the spirituality of money" appears as an oxymoron is the accepted definition of spirituality as non-material. As I have argued, the New Age phenomenon represents the logical conclusion of this theology, with its transcendent, otherworldly spirituality contrasting with society and history. By relegating God to a transcendental, timeless realm, it becomes possible to play down the implications of a prophetic theology of social justice. Proposing exactly such a theology, Hull argues that the contrast of spirituality with materiality is a distraction that has blinded us to the fact that God seeks justice in the world, just as money exerts its own spiritual force.

The spread of global consumer capitalism makes it likely that money as an ultimate concern will intensify, fueled by New Age language and techniques. Frank (2001), for example, describes how New Age ideas, previously part of a counter-cultural movement, are now part of business life. Free enterprise has been re-shaped as a kind of "cool," avant-garde rebellion against fuddy-duddy conformism. It is the epitome of cool, for example, to float a dot.com enterprise on the stock exchange. In this sense, previously anti-establishment language is now very much part of the establishment. Entrepreneurs are not embarrassed about talking of becoming "self-actualized" and "realizing one's higher self."

Is this the kind of character holistic education should aim to produce? I am not suggesting at all

that transcendentalist, perennialist educators intend this outcome, only that, without greater distancing from New Age assumptions and techniques, this may be the unintentional result.

Dewey and the Romantic Vision

Where can holistic education turn now? It can certainly become another way of bringing about the totally free and self-determined individual, actively creating his or her reality and seeking ultimate empowerment and mastery over one's environment. Yet a holistic education that is genuinely oriented towards wholeness must oppose itself to the forces of institutionalized greed. In order to do this, as a phenomenon of Western, affluent societies, it needs to be clear about how it situates itself within the romantic postmodernism affecting those societies.

I propose that holistic education should resist the lure of "interior depth" and cultic individualism and instead return to a more Deweyan strain of Romanticism based in utopianism and ecological understanding. This means a philosophical rationale that is social and embodied. For Dewey, it is only in the intersubjective web of culture and language that meaning is generated. He deplores the way that

> interest in the "inner life" has set off psychological subject matter as a separate world of existence, instead of a discovery of attitudes and dispositions involved in the world of experience.

He adds that "in truth, attitudes, dispositions and their kin … are never separate existences. They are always of, from, toward, situations and things" (LW 1, 238). Art and creativity, in this view, are less about giving expression to the depths of the psyche than extending the natural theater and intensity of everyday experience. Alexander (1998, 6) describes the way that Dewey's aesthetics are rooted in such things as "the drama of steel workers catching hot bolts on the high beams, or the "tense grace of the ball player." Creative expression is therefore dedicated to enhancing the sense of communal life and spirituality, rather than articulating private fantasy. As he argued in *A Common Faith* (1934), spirituality is rooted in our common hopes, dreams, problems, and predicaments. It is the opposite of autistic self-centeredness. Dewey felt that "of all affairs, communication is the most wonderful" (LW 1, 166) and that language, as a social invention, is the best tool for enhancing community. "The heart of language," he writes, "is not "expression" of something antecedent, much less expression of antecedent thought. It is communication; the establishment of co-operation in an activity in which there are partners, and in which the activity of each is modified and regulated by partnership" (LW 1, 179).

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Teaching as a Moral Enterprise

David Brell

Living lives at least partially dedicated to the welfare of all is the goal of all of the world's great religious traditions. It is also the true goal of education.

The most important function of schooling is moral education. For what could be more important than helping others—and ourselves—to become better people? Even a moment's reflection will reveal that any of the other typically proffered goals of education (transmission of culture, preparation for the workforce, responsible citizenship) are secondary. They tacitly presuppose that what is learned will be put to good use—will be used in the service of what is Good—and that this Good is of higher importance than any of its subsidiary aims. For there is no higher purpose for our existence than to live a Good life.

This is not to say that acquiring a useful and shared body of knowledge and skills is irrelevant. On the contrary, while moral virtue may or may not be predicated upon such learnings, they nonetheless extend the range and depth of our service to a higher good. Moreover, the broader and deeper our understanding of our complex, interdependent world, and the more skilled we are at navigating it, the less likely it is that our actions will bring unintentional harm to others or to the environment. So a major goal of education is definitely the acquisition of knowledge and skills. It is just not the paramount aim.

Morality Defined

All this, of course, begs the question: What is the Good? This question has been asked countless times, no doubt in every culture, throughout recorded history—not the least by educators. For Plato, one of the seminal figures in Western culture, it was the primary philosophical concern, and it arguably comprised the foundation of his entire philosophical system. Through a method of contemplative dialogue called dialectic, he arrived at his answer: *The Good* is *justice* (although what he meant by justice is not what we conventionally think of when we use that term, a point I'll return to later.)

For our present purposes, a more appropriate method of inquiry is that used by Plato's student, Ar-

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istotle, who began any investigation into moral matters by asking, "What is the conventional wisdom on the subject?" Following Aristotle, then, I ask, "What personal qualities and social works do we, as a people, most value?" These attributes and actions should give us at least some indication of what we collectively deem to be Good.

In public opinion polls, the world's three most admired people, in my lifetime, have been, in chronological order, Eleanor Roosevelt, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Mother Teresa.[1] Eleanor Roosevelt, a shy and reclusive person whose unusual and painful personal life was under constant public scrutiny, became the world's foremost spokesperson on human rights for over a decade. Martin Luther King, who received constant death threats over a period of some twelve years, literally gave his life in the fight for racial and economic justice. And Mother Teresa, a gifted and outgoing visionary who continued to work sixteen-hour days after each of her three heart attacks, spent the greater part of her life tending to diseased and neglected peoples with little regard for her own personal safety or comfort.

Looking at the lives of these three remarkable people, we immediately see a common theme of service to humanity. Within that larger umbrella of service, I'd like to focus on what I see as three virtues which each of these people exemplifies—justice, caring, and resolve—which I construe as corresponding roughly to our mental, emotional, and behavioral life. Specifically, these three people were (1) guided by a principle of justice, (2) motivated by a caring attitude, and (3) possessed of a resolute character.[2]

By *justice* I mean equal respect for the autonomy of individuals, as expressed, for example, in Immanuel Kant's maxim, "Treat each person never as a means but as an end only." By *caring* I mean an empathetic relationship based on what Nel Noddings (1984) calls "motivational displacement," which allows us to feel others within ourselves. And by *resolve* I mean commitment, the steadfastness of will to follow the dictates of our enlightened heart and mind. These three virtues—justice, caring, and resolve—working in concert, comprise what I call *moral integrity*: consistency of thought (justice), feeling (caring), and action (resolve) directed towards the benefit of all.

There is a persistent human tendency to elevate one or another of these three virtues above the others. But in the state of moral integrity they are of equal importance; they work together and none of them can stand without both of the other two. As many feminists have pointed out, justice without caring is abstract and formal—unable to respond to the particular needs and demands of individuals, communities, and situations. Equally the case, caring without justice lacks an adequate means or rationale for discriminating between competing obligations, manifesting as the primary challenge to feminist ethics: "How does one broaden the circle of caring so as to include the welfare of all, equally and universally?" What we surely want is an ethic of universal care, just as we want an ethic of compassionate justice. And it should almost go without saying that neither justice nor caring, alone or together, means a thing without the resolve to cultivate and act on them in our daily lives.

Clearly, this ideal of moral integrity is a tall order. Fortunately, we have Eleanor Roosevelt, Martin Luther King, and Mother Teresa as concrete examples to encourage us. All three worked for social justice—specifically, for the rights and/or well-being of the least advantaged. All three were motivated by caring and demonstrated it in both their larger mission and daily interactions. And all three had the moral resolve to act on their commitments, even at their own personal expense.

We cannot think of these people and not be humbled, yet also inspired. Because, while we are probably not individually destined to such personal greatness ourselves, they set an example of service to the well-being of others to which we can all aspire.

Moral Education, Religion, and Secularity

The teachings of the world's religious traditions are many and varied. But one theme that is central to them all is the assurance that selfless service is the key to lasting happiness. Each of these traditions has a principal figure who both points the way and serves as an example for us to follow. Rama, Moses, Buddha, Confucius, Jesus, Mohammed, and many others all espoused codes of selfless conduct, as demonstrated in their words and deeds, which form the very foundation of their respective faiths. Indeed, all these faiths begin with moral precepts as the ground-

work of spiritual practice: the Ten Commandments of Judaism and Christianity, the *yamas* and *niyamas* of Patanjali's Yoga Aphorisms, Buddhism's Eightfold Path, and the Five Pillars of Islam.

Putting aside for the moment the myriad "do"s and "don't"s of all these traditions (for these tend to be highly dependent on the cultural context in which they arose)—what are the essential virtues they all implore us to cultivate? Although we could frame our answer in innumerable ways, I don't think it's unreasonable to answer that the essential virtues are something approximating justice, caring, and resolve.

If that language seems too secular, one might substitute hope, love, and faith (if one is Christian); wisdom, compassion, and purity (if one is Buddhist); and so on. Despite differences in tone, nuance, and even meaning, they all speak to the same idea: that virtue is simultaneously of the mind, heart, and body, as well as the soul. This unity of purpose is what I earlier called moral integrity and, incidentally, is precisely what Plato meant by his more encompassing use of the term *justice*.[3]

Traditionally, the development of these qualities has been the province not only of religion but also of education. Indeed, the separation of education-for-virtue and education-for-knowledge would have been inconceivable to the founders of the world's great religions. Yet, in today's democratic societies, such separation is the norm.

I see three possible reasons for this unfortunate separation, in ascending order of validity.

The first, but least valid, reason can be found in the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which, roughly speaking, mandates (among other things) the separation of church and state. Now I happen to believe we have separated church and state for very good reasons, the chief one being that it provides an institutional safeguard against religious intolerance. Allegiance to *my* God and people at the expense of *yours* has arguably been the most destructive of all human failings.

Given the world's incredible diversity of cultures and individuals, it is absurd to suppose that there is a single spiritual path that is the best for everybody. Even among believers of the same faith, no two individuals follow *exactly* the same path any more than they live *exactly* the same life or have *exactly* the same genetic make-up. Reality is so contrary to such a homogeneous state of affairs that it becomes obvious that we must cultivate a certain tolerance—better yet, understanding and appreciation—of our different beliefs and practices. The separation of church and state ensures, as a minimum, that government will not interfere with people's religious freedom.

It is easy to infer that the separation of church and state has led to the secularization of public life in the United States and a lessening commitment to moral education. And to a very limited extent that may be true. But the fact is that the separation of church and state and the separation of education-for-virtue and education-for-knowledge are not synonymous. There is nothing about the legal separation of religion and government that prevents us individually or collectively from inquiring into and cultivating inner qualities of justice, caring, and moral resolve, or from trying to instill these virtues in young people in formal educational settings.

A second, more valid, explanation for the decrease in morality as an educational concern is not the separation of church and state but the fact that we, as a society, are less religious than we used to be. By which I mean we are less concerned with the bearing that our conduct and beliefs have on our individual and collective salvation. Now, it isn't religion or its demise that I mean to talk about at this time. The connection to our present topic—teaching as a moral enterprise—is this: It is chiefly in the context of religion that moral education has historically taken place. And with the decline of religion we have seen growing confusion over moral education: what it is, how to do it, whether or not to do it, "whose morality" should be taught, and so on.

This confusion, however, is not a bad thing. Rather than causing us to abandon moral inquiry, it can and often does lead us to inquire into and discuss these matters together, as a society—as should be the case in a democracy. I would rather we were confused on such matters than wrong; specifically, I would rather we discuss these questions together—uncertainly—than force our way of thinking onto others, particularly onto children. Like the protection of religious freedom, a forum for open, democratic discussion of important social issues is

one of the most positive legacies of the European Enlightenment.[4]

Moral Education and Materialism

This brings us to the third, and most pertinent, reason moral education has been divorced from education in general—and it is connected with one of the more destructive consequences of that same Enlightenment I just praised. Along with the decline of religion has come the growing materialism and consumerism of modern, Western culture (which is fast becoming the norm for most of the world). With the spectacular successes of science and technology in improving our understanding and control of physical reality, the goals of physical comfort, efficiency, consumption, and the status of ownership have increasingly become what drive us, individually and as a society.

Of course, people have always been concerned with physical survival and comfort. But to listen to the last three U.S. presidents talk about education, one would conclude that its overriding purpose is not to make us better people but to improve our economy—as if a strong economy is the key to personal and social fulfillment.

As the Dalai Lama (1999) himself points out, having a strong economy is certainly a good thing insofar as it alleviates suffering and raises the standard of living for everyone. But there are several problems with making it *the* national priority.

To begin, recent statistics show that a strong economy and a high standard of living for all are not necessarily correlative. It is a well-known fact that at no point in U.S. history has the distance between the income of the rich and the poor been greater than it is today. And while the increased wealth of the rich has the potential for trickling down to the poor, this does not in fact seem to be the case for substantial numbers of Americans (let alone the other peoples of the world!). In the 1990s, for example, one out of every five children in the U.S. lived below the poverty line (Terry 2000), the highest child poverty rate of any industrialized nation, despite our comparative wealth. Although this ratio has improved somewhat in recent years, what happens when the present economic trajectory falters, as it inevitably must? Who will be the first to suffer?

Second, greater material success does not bring individual happiness. In fact, it can hurt just as easily as it can help. With increased ownership often comes increased preoccupation with one's possessions and wealth. Such preoccupation, aside from its tendency to cause us to disregard the feelings and well-being of others, distracts and diverts us from the deeper and more lasting joys of companionship, service, and spiritual connection.

Third, greater material prosperity has not alleviated the moral crises that plague our society. Consider this example. As an educator of teachers, I often begin one of my courses with two questions: What is the biggest problem facing American society today? and How can schools help to alleviate it? For six straight years, my students' answers have been the same, as have their solutions.

The problems, in no particular order, are "disrespect, inequity, break-up of the family, loss of community, violence, and prejudice."[5] I hasten to point out that these are all moral problems. A stronger economy does not alleviate them; indeed, most of them have worsened as the economy has grown.

Like economics, science and technology (which have taken the place of religion as the highest cultural authorities) have little to offer in the way of solving these social ills. Empirical research can certainly help us to understand their causes and consequences, but I think it's apparent that these problems do not lend themselves to external, physical solutions. What they require is a transformation of our hearts and minds, a reordering of our priorities, and a discovery of the true sources of human fulfillment.[6]

Let's look at my students' suggestions for how schools can help to alleviate these problems: Reach out to families and communities; Make the classroom a micro-community; Combat prejudice with multicultural and anti-bias education; Institute a service-learning program; Build schools next to family centers; Allow only caring people to become teachers.

This sounds like the beginning of a blueprint for moral education! Notice especially its emphasis on attitudes and relationships—something foreign to national standards and assessments, the current silver bullets for our educational woes. And that's because the call for standards and assessments, though not inherently a bad thing, is not motivated by con-

cern for our moral and spiritual well-being but by the kind of preoccupation with material success that I earlier said can divert attention away from where it's really needed. Where that attention is *most* needed, if my students' list of concerns is any indication, is on our inner selves—our principles, attitudes, and character—not our performance.

In other words, if our biggest social problems are in reality moral problems, and if these moral problems can only be solved by cultivating in ourselves qualities of justice, caring, and resolve, then it would seem that the promotion of moral integrity should be our highest educational priority. If such is indeed the case, then improved performance, and the knowledge and skills on which it depends, should be seen as contributing or subsidiary aims, and should never be mistaken for our guiding purpose, which is to make ourselves not better *performers* but better *people*.

Moral Education: An Imperative

There are those who say it's not the job of schools, especially public schools, to teach morality. But the fact of the matter is that we do it every day, whether we intend to or not, whether we like it or not. We do it by our example; by what we include, emphasize, and omit; by how we deal with situations, ourselves, and each other. So rather than bemoaning or denying the unavoidable moral responsibility of teaching, we need to confront it head on. *To do any less is to leave this most important function of schooling to accident*.

Let me tell you a story to illustrate my point. Not too long ago a colleague and I facilitated a workshop on stereotyping and name-calling at a local high school. In the course of the workshop we asked some 50 students for examples of discrimination and stereotyping from their own school experience. More than half the examples they gave—and this took us somewhat by surprise—were of *teachers*' prejudicial behaviors.

Think about that: Most of the examples these students gave of in-school discrimination were of teachers' thoughtless, hurtful, and cruel remarks. These remarks usually took the form of name-calling, and by far the biggest target group was gays—although race, social class, ethnicity, gender, religion, ability, and body weight all appeared to give rise to teachers' expressions of intolerance. Students reported that the words "fag," "dyke," "portagee,"[7] "wop," "spaz," "load," and so on were not particularly used in anger but were tossed off in a casual and thoughtless manner that made them seem all the more acceptable.

The good news is that these students, at least the ones who spoke up, didn't accept such language. And we could see the silent ones either nodding in agreement or squirming in their seats because they themselves sometimes used such terms. Apparently, the students—if not the teachers—knew better. But how long before "chink," "bitch," "ho," "wuss," "kike," and "fairy" begin to seem like acceptable ways to refer to groups of people and individuals, at least in private and semi-public conversation?

My story doesn't end with the terrible example some teachers are setting for students. Equally disturbing, though perhaps more subtle, was the students' unanimous agreement that they'd never once heard teachers broach this subject; this was the first time that any of them could recall discussing name-calling and stereotyping in school—ever! (I'm happy to point out, however, that my colleague and I were there at the request of the school administration, which was clearly trying to rectify this situation.)

Now, recall our starting premise—that the most important function of schooling is moral education—and you can see just how far schools have strayed from this vital purpose.

So, what can we do to improve our situation? As this story makes clear, one way we teach morality is by example. Obviously, teachers must eliminate all pejoratives from their vocabularies. Yet simply not expressing attitudes of intolerance and prejudice is clearly not enough. As people often said in the 1960s, "If you're not part of the solution, you're part of the problem." That is, if one assumes a position of neutral inaction in the face of a social wrong, one unwittingly endorses it. (We need look no further than the Holocaust to see the potential consequences of such a lack of resolve.)

How one responds is, of course, a matter of personal choice, and our response will vary with our personal style, talents, and disposition. But I believe we all have a moral as well as professional obligation to advocate on behalf of students who are targeted for being different. Whether this means, for example,

joining a gay/straight alliance in our school or simply forbidding name-calling in our classroom, we need to be active and we need to be heard.

One of the best books I've read on moral education is *The Challenge to Care in Schools* by Nel Noddings (1992). In it she re-envisions the entire curriculum and organization of the school, starting from the premise that the most important function of schooling is the promotion of caring. Reading this book one sees very quickly how differently schools would look if caring was indeed our highest priority.

Short of a complete overhaul of our schools, there are other, intermediary steps we can all take. We can lead open discussions with students on pressing moral concerns (Sizer 1985). We can allow students more of a role in setting and realizing their own goals (Noddings 1995). We can sort students in non-discriminatory ways that honor their individual talents, interests, and choices (Sizer and Sizer 1999). We can find ways for students to serve their communities and reflect on the personal and social benefits of that service (Erickson and Anderson 1997). We can give students the primary responsibility for articulating and enforcing codes of school conduct (Power, Higgins, and Kohlberg 1989)

Above all, we can, and should, cultivate in ourselves and in the school community—but first of all in ourselves—the disposition of mindfulness (Kane and Snauwaert 1999). By this I mean that we, as educators, must each look inside ourselves, carefully and vigilantly, to examine our thoughts (justice), feelings (caring), and actions (resolve), and how they interrelate. We should, in short, strive for moral integrity. For only in this way can we truly set the kind of example for our students that we should. Writes the Dalai Lama:

> By their own behavior, [teachers] can make children remember them for their whole lives. If this behavior is *principled*, *disciplined*, and *compassionate* [just, resolute, and caring], their values will be readily impressed on the child's mind. This is because the lessons taught by a teacher with a positive motivation ... penetrate deepest into their students' minds. (1999, 183, emphases added)

How can we begin to cultivate mindfulness? For this purpose, there may be no more important question than this: "What motivates me to do the things I do?"

For six years I lived in the relative seclusion of a spiritual community. During that time, one of the most instructive spiritual exercises I undertook was maintaining silence for extended periods of time, the longest for me being two weeks. An exercise like this really forces one to look at one's thoughts and motivations. During such periods of silence, as I observed the impulse to speak, I constantly found myself asking, "Now, what made me want to say that?" Suffice it to say that, if I had to ask, my motivation wasn't noble but rather selfish and immature (which, I have come to believe, are really the same thing).

As adults, we become accustomed to thinking of ourselves as well-meaning, conscientious people, seldom appreciating the extent to which selfishness in fact motivates us—especially when we're not paying attention. This is why cultivating mindfulness is so important; only by *paying attention* can we begin to transform ourselves into more just, caring, and resolute people.

Mother Teresa (1996) called such attentiveness *prayer*—and suggested that it takes a lifetime of effort to make it an abiding state of awareness. Whatever our method of paying attention and of working towards the goal of moral integrity, be it prayer, meditation, or some other form of contemplative practice, I believe she's onto something. For as we all know beyond the shadow of a doubt, Mother Teresa was not seeking material gain, pleasure, fame, or any other form of self-gratification; she was simply acting on the *universal* moral intuition that being of service to others is the noblest of human callings.

The potential for living lives at least partially dedicated to the welfare of all exists in each of us. It is the promise of the world's great religious traditions, which teach us — without exception — that cultivating attributes of justice, caring, and resolve is the means to true and lasting fulfillment. And I believe it is the true goal of education.

Notes

1. It is common knowledge that during the 1950s (when I was growing up) Eleanor Roosevelt was repeatedly recognized as the world's most admired woman. And, in its end-of-the-millennium U.S. opinion polls, the Gallup organization found Mother Teresa and Martin Luther King, Jr. to be the two most admired people of the last half-century (Newport, Moore, and Saad 1999).

2. As suggested by Betty Sichel, in her excellent though much overlooked book, *Moral Education: Character, Community, and Ideals* (1988), a complete theory of moral education should incorporate three kinds of moral concern: principles, attitudes, and character.

3. From the *Republic*:

> Justice ... is a principle of this kind; its real concern is not with external actions, but with a man's [sic] inward self, his true concern and interest. The just man will not allow the three elements which make up his inward self [mind, emotions, and body] to trespass on each other's functions or interfere with each other, but, by keeping all three in tune, like the notes of a scale ..., will in the truest sense set his house to rights, attain self-mastery and order, and live on good terms with himself. (443c-d)

This is Desmond Lee's (1974) translation. Of those widely available, I feel it best captures Plato's meaning.

4. As many other educational theorists have noted (e.g., Burbules 1995; Greene 1995; Howe 1998), there is an unfortunate tendency among many postmodernists to expound upon the undeniable evils of the Enlightenment, overlooking its equally undeniable and enduring contributions. Following Jurgen Habermas (1987), Charles Taylor (1989), and others, Ken Wilber (1995, 1998) renders a more balanced and realistic picture than that of obsessive deconstructionists, what he calls "the dignity" and "the disaster" of modernity. In a nutshell, the "dignity" of modernity was its differentiation of three knowledge spheres — science, morals, and art (objective, normative, and subjective respectively)—and the accompanying ethic of universal respect for persons; the "disaster" was the subsequent hegemony of scientism, which invaded and denied the other two spheres, objectifying persons and repudiating their inner life, collective as well as individual. (For Wilber's most extended discussion of this dynamic as of this writing, see *Sex, Ecology, and Spirituality*, chs. 11-13).

5. Surprisingly, "environmental degradation" has not yet found its way onto this list, though I expect it's only a matter of time before it does.

6. This is not to disavow science or the part it has to play as an agent of our growth and happiness. On the contrary, that role is vital. I agree with Habermas and Wilber that the only way to remediate the disaster of modernity is not to replace scientism with some other "truth regime" but rather to cultivate an integral worldview which coordinates and honors equally the objective, normative, and subjective spheres.

7. "Portagee," an epithet for Portuguese (one of the largest ethnic groups of Southern New England), is used by many people to connote "stupid."

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In Search of the Holocaust

Laila Lipetz

A trip by 80 Israeli students to visit sites associated with the Holocaust became an experience in holistic growth.

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It was love, for my Israeli husband and for the Israel of my Zionist upbringing, that convinced me to move our quickly growing family from our urban, Canadian home to his *kibbutz*, a communal farming village. It was 1982 and the Israeli-Lebanese War was raging just a few miles north of our settlement. From those first moments, watching the military transports go by with their young soldiers, I realized that my life was going to be lived with an intensity I had not known in Canada.

I taught English and was homeroom advisor at the local high school, a regional school run by the *kibbutzim* and *moshavim* (cooperative farms) in the area. In addition to the standard high school subjects, the school was committed to values teaching, specifically the left-of-center, peace promoting, liberal humanist values of the founding generations of the communal and cooperative farming settlements. Each year, a meaningful central theme, such as democracy, secular Jewish identity or Arab/Israeli coexistence, was explored through weekly lessons and a study week, either on or off site. For students in Grade 12, there was also the opportunity to participate in a trip to Poland, to learn about the Holocaust.

In Israel, the public dialogue is always multisided, vibrant and fractious, and Holocaust education was no different. Student trips to Poland were controversial. Many educators doubted the need for the trip, as they felt the Holocaust could be well taught in school, just as one taught other subjects. Moreover, there was little left to see in Poland that spoke of the vibrant pre-war Jewish community or of the Holocaust itself. Other educators contended that, while there was certainly important learning to be done in school, actually experiencing Poland allowed a greater understanding of the event. The little that was left must be seen before it, too, was gone. To my great fortune, my school supported the latter view.

The participants on the school's 1990 trip were 80 Grade 12 students and seven teachers/homeroom advisors. We all lived in farming communities, some communal, some cooperative. The students were secular Jews, who had a strong sense of Jewish identity but very little knowledge or understanding of traditional/religious practices. Some were of European heritage and were directly related through family history to the events of the Holocaust; others were of North African descent and their relation to the Holocaust was based on their sense of connection to their people's history. In a year's time, all these 17-year-old students would be serving in the Israeli army.

In Israel, everyone is familiar with the Holocaust. Holocaust Day is commemorated yearly by *Ashkenazi* (European) Jews as well as *Sephardic* (North Africa) Jews, with ceremonies and memorial services. When the sirens go off at 10:00 a.m., the entire Jewish population stops and remembers. Many Israelis are Holocaust survivors, and they and their children are scarred by the trauma. Jewish history is a large presence in the curriculum because it is part of Bible studies, history, and modern Israeli politics. It is classically taught as a series of triumphs and tragedies, and the tragedy of the Holocaust, which so closely preceded the triumph of the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, is known to all. But this was not felt to be sufficient preparation for the trip to Poland.

The homeroom advisors, the trip coordinator, and the students met extensively during the six months before the trip for study sessions. We met with four Holocaust survivors, each with a tragic story of loss and suffering. We interviewed children of survivors and heard how their lives, too, were touched by the Holocaust. We visited a Holocaust museum to learn more extensively about the history of the period. We visited the Museum of the Diaspora to learn more about pre-World War II Jewish life in Poland. We heard a lecture on the history of Poland, a history of loss and repeated conquest. We consulted with a psychologist as to how to handle the inevitable stress of our journey, then engaged in extensive group- dynamics activities to enable us to be more supportive of one another.

The primary mode of learning before the trip was transmission learning, which "is characterized by the student receiving and accumulating knowledge and skills" (Miller 1996, p. 6). Information was imparted directly and efficiently. The history of Poland was described with a series of maps and an intensive lecture. The communal lives of Jews in pre-war Poland was related with facts, figures, names of communities, and their leadership. Zionism's role, the British Mandate rule of pre-war Palestine, the positions and activities of various world leaders, and the implications for Europe's Jewry were explored. The role of democracy in Weimar Germany, the rise to power of Adolph Hitler, the readiness of the German nation to embrace the nationalist, optimistic vision that Nazism proposed, the increasing limitations on Jews and other undesirables in Germany, and the responses of the Jewish and world community to these events were described. A concise history of World War II was taught, with special emphasis on the events in Poland and on the Holocaust's effects throughout Europe. Those students with an academic bent, and the teachers, were well prepared for the scholarly side of the trip.

There was some transaction learning, in our visits off-site to museums and in the stories we heard from survivors. This was learning that was "more interactive although the interaction (was) mainly cognitive" (Miller 1996, p. 6). The museums required an interaction with the materials, with students discussing the meaning of the displays, as they struggled to contextualize, on both a personal and intellectual level, what they saw. The gripping, painful stories of the survivors were haunting, and we asked questions afterwards. This part of the learning aroused us all, but left us with more questions than answers. The trip ahead, almost entirely transformative in position, completed the education.

The trip's basic itinerary was simple. We spent ten days in Poland, searching for signs of the Jewish life that had been. We toured sites once associated with Polish Jewry, such as synagogues, schools, cemeteries, and Jewish neighbourhoods, most of them now converted to other uses. We explored Majdanek, Treblinka, and Auschwitz-Birkenau, three of the six death camps that were situated in Poland. We stopped at the many thoughtfully designed, large,

and impressive Jewish monuments. At every significant venue, such as each of the concentration camps, the site of the Warsaw Ghetto, the monument to the freedom fighters of the failed ghetto uprising and the Jewish cemetery in Warsaw, we participated in a student-designed and -led ceremony. In the evenings, before we all relaxed and socialized, we met for student-led group sessions to share the day's experiences and impressions. On returning to Israel, we held our final ceremony just outside the airport terminal.

Holistic education was at the heart of this trip, even though the trip designers did not know the term. It was a holistic learning experience not only for the students but for myself as well. I had not been involved with the design of the trip nor the implicit curriculum, so I approached it with the readiness of a learner. I had never been to Poland and, despite a lifetime of grappling with the events of the Holocaust, in both my formal Jewish education and in my personal explorations, I knew there was more much to understand. I chose to write about this learning event when I thought I had only my memories and some photographs taken by a student to help me out. My mother, however, was able to unearth an audio cassette I had sent her the week I returned from Poland. It renders heartfelt, wrenching, immediate confirmation to my present memories. The cassette is my voice, but my voice of a decade ago, and will be cited as a resource.

Miller (1996) states that holistic education involves exploring and making connections. He writes:

> The focus of holistic education is on relationships: the relationship between linear thinking and intuition, the relationship between mind and body, the relationships among various domains of knowledge, the relationship between the individual and community, the relationship to the earth, and the relationship between self and Self (p. 8).

All but the relationship between mind and body were explored on the trip.

As students and teachers, we were used to problem solving, linear thinking, and sequential reasoning. On the trip, a balance was created with intuition, because without intuition one could not grasp the meaning of so many physical elements of the trip. The monuments were metaphor made concrete. Whether abstract or figurative, their meaning came through only with a non-linear response. The size of the constructs, the vastness of some of the sites, the huge numbers of pieces, the dark colors, the harsh natural materials such as jagged rocks, the man-made materials such as desecrated Jewish headstones, and the actual human material that was the mountain of human ash all evoked an intuitive response. They used no language, but were truly universal and non-intellectual. Noddings and Shore (1984) describe this intuitive activity as one that "involves immediate contact with the objects of knowledge or feeling. Cognitive or conceptual schemes do not intervene or mediate the interaction … we allow ourselves to be moved, appeared to, grasped" (p. 89). A rational, thought-out response to the essentially symbolic "objects" of the Holocaust could provide little beyond what we had already learned in Israel. The intuitive reading of the monuments created profound emotional responses to the physicalized, metaphoric representation of suffering and loss.

Collections of personal artifacts were displayed in buildings in the concentration camps. Objects such as shoes, clothing, prostheses, eyeglasses, and human hair required a leap of the imagination to understand the humanity of the object. In the cassette I said,

> a sea of shoes, it's like walking on all those bodies, all those people, I don't know but they just evoked this feeling … and you realized you were walking above them, between them, around them, surrounded by all those people, who could no longer wear these shoes. (Lipetz 1990)

Each object became a representation of a life, felt, sensed, understood, through intuition.

Only through visualization, through the constant use of the imagination and the mind's eye could I "see" what I had come to see. Treblinka was just an empty clearing in the peaceful, lush woods, covered with the jagged rocks of the monument, each rock inscribed with the name of a lost Jewish community. The site of the Warsaw Ghetto, bombed during the uprising, was bulldozed after the war and is now covered by a Soviet-style apartment complex. This was visualization not for visions of wholeness, heal-

ing, creative expression, positive self-awareness, religious ecstasy, or inner peace such as Samuels and Samuels (1975) describe, but as a means of entering the heart of darkness. The trip provided the conditions for visualization recommended by Noddings (1975, p. 105). There was the combination of feeling in one's own quiet mental space, of physically being in the haunting silent physical spaces, and the trip's deliberate distancing us from our ordinary concerns, even from ordinary experiences of contemporary Poland. I spoke of the students' exhaustion after a day at a concentration camp, an exhaustion in part caused by the demands of visualization. You needed "tremendous ability to concentrate and create a vision of what was there…. It's there but it's not there; it's draining" (Lipetz 1990). Later I reported that while standing in a gas chamber, "I could really feel and see that millions were shoved through and lost their lives, that this enormous camp was filled with suffering, with bodies and blood, lost lives and lost dignity … it was just all there" (Lipetz 1990). But it was not all there—it existed in my mind's eye, through visualization.

The ceremonies were composed of various pieces of poetry, prose, song, and instrumental music, selected and performed by the students. Each ceremony ended with Kaddish, the traditional Jewish prayer for the dead, and HaTikvah, The Hope, the Israeli national anthem. At first, we were all uncomfortable with these religious, national expressions of community. We were non-synagogue goers who not only did not know the words of the prayer, many of the students did not even know the words to the anthem. From ceremony to ceremony, these repeated rituals took on meaning, not on a cognitive level—Kaddish is in Aramaic, and the anthem is in poetic, somewhat antiquated language—but rather, on a heart-felt, intuitive level, creating meditative moments through prayer and song. The students felt a wholeness that they had never experienced before in their usual studies of Judaism, and many experienced their first truly religious feelings. The prayer and song were our communal expressions of loss and rebirth as a nation. They echoed the contradiction of exploring mass funeral grounds for European Jewry with young, vibrant citizens of a Jewish state. Together, standing at places resonating with history, we felt the awe of the moment and the tragedy of the past.

Our trip connected us to our larger Jewish community, past and present. We had studied Jewish history and had internalized and personalized its themes and messages. We felt connected to Jewish teens all over the world who would be going on a similar trip later in the spring, called "March of the Living." As a school we strengthened our sense of community, as the students discovered one another by exploring beyond their small groups of friends. They had an opportunity to know their teachers and homeroom advisors on a more intimate basis. The connection between self and community was more formally planned into the tour during student-led sessions each evening, when we were given an opportunity to respond to our day's experiences. We had agreed from the start that whatever was said was not to be criticized, that there were no wrong personal responses. Much like journals, these meetings were non-critical, accepting environments for self-expression, for "observing, raising questions, speculating, discovering self, digressing, synthesizing, revising (and) demonstrating learning" (Hiebert and Raphael 1996, p. 224). We stepped outside our own responses and connected with the experiences of others.

On my tape, I repeatedly referred to the earth and nature. I spoke, as Miller (1996) says, with "a sense of the sacred and how we are deeply embedded in the natural processes of the earth" (p. 154). But I did so with a harsh reading of the relationship. I had a sense that I was walking on hallowed ground, but that the sacred had been created out of tragedy, that "I was walking on people, their bones and their ashes, or simply on their misery, on pure concentrated human misery" (Lipetz 1990). I felt it at the spot where my colleague's mother last saw her family alive, at the monument where the candle burned in memory of my mother-in-law's town and for the family my children never knew, at the open field where 800,000 bodies and human ash were disposed of beneath the earth. The earth was also an enemy to human memory as the few artifacts that remained were sinking into the mud. I said, " nature swallows the cemeteries up…. The stones are just disappearing. In twenty years' time, there will be nothing to see" (Lipetz

1990). At Treblinka, I connected to nature, and was troubled by my response, as "the vegetation, the smells, the crunching leaves on the ground, the crispness of the air, were, horrifyingly, so reminiscent of Muskoka and my happy times at summer camp" (Lipetz 1990). I felt the "incredible silence, the trees and the earth just swallow up any sound . . . and it's so quiet, the way nature is quiet, the way nature is cruel, the way nature doesn't care" (Lipetz 1990). My awareness of nature was built on an earth that both holds sacred and conceals human memory and misery.

This trip gave me the opportunity to step out of my many roles—mother, wife, teacher, Israeli/Canadian, Jew—to connect with my Self. At what was probably the busiest time in my life—I had four children, aged eight and under—I had the opportunity to detach from daily life and touch deeply inside myself. I said

> It's a week and a half that I have devoted to spiritual matters. I don't usually spend time wondering about existence and meaning and mankind…. I gave a piece of my life to try and penetrate the human spirit. (Lipetz 1990)

The students were not selected for the trip, i.e., there were no academic, intellectual, spiritual, or social requirements in order to participate. This created a pressing need to recognize the whole child and his/her different ways of learning. Some of our students were vocational students, for whom a straight academic or abstract thinking approach could not work. We had music and art students, who looked to the arts to make meaning. Engineering and auto mechanics students related strongly to the tactile, structural, and design elements in what we saw. The trip was designed with an awareness of the concept of multiple intelligences (Gardner 1999), though not the terminology, in mind. All our senses and sensibilities were at work. We experienced fully by looking, touching, listening, talking, thinking, reading, praying, singing, crying, and comforting. Each of us drew on our personal strengths and connected with the places and people around us.

This trip created much more than the intimacy of a field trip. Miller (1993) speaks of the need for a caring, authentic teacher. On this trip the relationship was between caring, authentic teachers and caring, authentic students. We not only ate, slept, travelled, and toured together. We even went beyond the intimacies of relieving ourselves in the bushes together and dancing the nights away at discotheques. We also discussed the meaning of life, our personal and religious identities, our places in the world and in world history. We stood on killing fields and searched our souls, wondering what we would have done. As we drove away from Treblinka,

> all of the parts of the puzzled came together, I had it all, a sense of what had been and wasn't anymore, what had happened…. The numbers now made sense…. I felt it, I could see it, I could understand it…. I had to cry, a crying jag cry. (Lipetz 1990)

I turned to my students, not my colleagues, for support. They took me in and created a private corner for me on the crowded bus, comforted me and, with the open innocence of youth, tried to solace me with chocolate. In a long career of powerful connections with my students, this memory is the strongest.

The most significant and long-term aspect of this trip is that it was truly transformative. I spoke of a woman whose works the students chose to read at the ceremonies. I said,

> the woman wrote that anyone who goes to Poland does not come back the same person. At first when they read it, it seemed a bit bombastic. But it's true! You've gone through an experience that gets you in touch with so many thoughts and feelings…. Even some of the kids said they'd grown up so much in that week…. They felt really different, it was so profound…. For me it wasn't only discovering the Holocaust…. There was the larger question for me of how can people become so brutalized…. We talk a lot about how modern society brutalizes us, and in Israel, we are brutalized…. How do you keep a clear sense of being human and humane…? It made me realize the importance of keeping your tolerance and understanding and being human…. There's more to all of this than what was done to us. (Lipetz 1990)

Soon after coming back from the trip, I started working on the weekends in the home for the elderly on my kibbutz. Before the trip, I would have been reluctant to change an adult's dirty diaper or care inti-

mately for ailing, older bodies. With the deep awareness of the need to look for the human, and with my sense of having journeyed into the depths of my being, I easily agreed to work there.

As for the students, they knew that they were meant to be the next generation of witnesses to the Holocaust, as those who survived were aging or already dead. The students went back to their communities and hosted evenings to pass on their experiences, acting on their new-found moral obligation not to let the story die. Yet, as I said ten years ago, "There's more to all of this than what was done to us." It is here that I perceive a weakness in the program: the trip's message lacked further contextualizing in a larger picture. It was critical that the children's understanding of human cruelty go beyond their role as Jewish victim, beyond a historical context, and beyond the Holocaust. Their new-found awareness needed to be used to sensitize them to inhumanities in other countries, and to their own unavoidable roles as aggressors when they soon became soldiers.

Drake's Story Model (1998) provides a way to create the missing, more universal social context. The old story is the Holocaust, the story of the perennially wandering Jews, a nation without a homeland or a refuge. The present story is a world with relatively little anti-Semitism and a sovereign, national homeland that is open to all Jews. The chauvinistic, fighting values of the eternal outsider, the support of the Diaspora Jewish community, and the world community's awareness of the injustice and tragic circumstances of a people without a land, created this successful present story. However, if these values and the sense of security that comes of having one's own country are allowed to develop unchecked, Israel's and the world's Jews may become desensitized. The lessons of the Holocaust must be applied to create a new story, one where human values and decency are central. These lessons are critical for even a hope of peaceful coexistence amongst the nations of the Mideast, and of the world. The students must know to be soldiers who remember the humanity of those around them; they must be voters who are aware of the needs of their adversaries as well as their own; they must be independent, effective citizens who do not let the privilege of a political voice be abused.

When I returned to Canada a few years after the trip, I was able, despite my secularism, to comfortably enter the world of Jewish education, as I had found a way to teach what was traditionally parochial with depth and breadth. The trip made clear to me that teaching about Judaism requires teaching about humanity; that Jewish values, in life and education, are best understood in the context of the universal. Judaism is best served within a holistic approach, and it is in this approach to teaching that I can find meaning for myself as educator, human, and Jew.

Each year on Holocaust Day, I revisit this trip. I take out the photographs my students gave me and hearken back to the feelings and places they had captured. I look especially closely at the candid picture of me, crying on the rubble of a crematorium in Auschwitz. It is a day not only for Holocaust remembrance, but a day to think of universal themes.

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Quantum Metaphors and the Study of the Mind-Brain

Delores D. Liston

Using the metaphors of quantum physics to sustain the bridge between matter and spirit helps us recognize the complementary interdependence of mind and brain, or mind-brain.

An important focus of my academic work has been the application of recent discoveries from the field of neuroscience to classroom teaching (Liston 1995; 2001). I believe that neuroscience has the potential to improve our ways of teaching and learning, but that this potential can only be realized by humanizing the highly technical language of brain science.

For example, through neuroscience, we are beginning to understand why many of our students perform poorly on exams when we are fairly certain that they know the material. Findings from neuroscience indicate that this results from our students "downshifting" as their brain physiology responds to stress (Caine and Caine 1991). That is, under the stress of test-taking, their cerebrum, the most advanced part of their brain, is slowed in the formation of neural networks while their less advanced brainstem becomes dominant. This is a very effective explanation of the physiological dimension of our learners. What remains is to translate this explanation into a format useful for classroom teachers.

Neuroscience does not help us understand the human factors that determine why some students interpret a test as threatening (and therefore downshift), while others interpret the same testing environment as challenging (and are able to excel). Although physiological explanations from neuroscience help us understand the mechanisms of the brain, they fall short of explaining the sociocultural and phenomenological factors that initiate a stressful versus challenging interpretation of experience. Thus, dehumanized explanations of neuroscience findings seem less than useful to classroom teachers and similarly remain outside the understanding of most people.

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Bridging Empirical and Spiritual Languages

If we are to understand—not just pull apart our mind-brains—the materialistic language of neuroscience research needs the interpretive lens offered by philosophical and spiritual languages. Interpreted through these languages, brain science can become more widely accessible to both lay persons and classroom teachers.

As explained above, the predominance of empirical analysis makes the translation of neuroscience findings into the human dimensions of teaching and learning very difficult. A neuroscience informed by human concerns could pursue useful explanations of educational experience outside of the laboratory, and lead to more applicable results for classroom teachers. A major obstacle in developing such a humanized neuroscience is the gap between empirical interpretations and spiritual/philosophical interpretations of neuroscience research.

Most authors in the field have attempted to address physiological questions. For example, they ask how the brain works, how neural networks are formed, or, as in our example, what happens in a brain under stress. These are what Kosslyn and Koenig (1992) refer to as the "easy questions." Meanwhile, these researchers have deftly avoided difficult spiritual and philosophical questions such as: "What is the relationship between a neural network and the thought associated with that network?", "What is the relationship between body and mind?", or, as in our example, "Why, given the same environment, does one student feel stress while another thrives upon challenge?"

Thus, there has been a tendency to either present neuroscience research in the reductionistic terms of the purely physiological and observable (Dennett 1991; Churchland and Sejnowski 1992), or dismiss neuroscience and pursue more humanistic interpretations of educational experience. In this way, a chasm has formed between the laboratory and the classroom. Classroom teachers, who could and should be able to benefit greatly from neuroscience research, are often left with the impression that these discoveries do not have practical implications for their own classroom behaviors and practices. Indeed, most teacher education courses and textbooks make no mention of neuroscience.

On the other hand, a few books and articles have been published that directly address neuroscience research and its connection to education. As early as 1983, Leslie Hart proposed proster theory to incorporate neuroscience findings into pedagogy. More recently, Renate and Geoffrey Caine (1997), Robert Sylwester (1995) and Eric Jensen (1998), among others, have contributed to an expanding body of literature that attempts to make neuroscience findings accessible to teachers. However, because the neuroscience findings upon which these texts are based are often preliminary (sometimes based on experiments with non-human subjects, and sometimes emerging from work with patients suffering traumatic brain injury), the positions developed in these texts are often premature and sometimes overreach the conclusions warranted by the data.

While recommending changes to pedagogy based on experiments with non-human subjects is premature, we can utilize neuroscience findings to shift our focus from what we should *do* in the classroom to how we should *be* in the classroom to promote learning. That is, although findings in neuroscience cannot yet tell teachers exactly what to *do* to enhance the learning of every student in their classrooms, these findings can serve to remind teachers of the complex and non-dualistic nature of human beings while illuminating the ultimately spiritual and metaphysical context within which we learn and *come to know*.

My research seeks to bridge the gap between the language of neuroscience (which tends to be very technical) and the languages of philosophy and human spirituality (which tend to be more open-ended), in order to make neuroscience accessible to the classroom teacher (Liston 2001).

Building this bridge is very difficult, as the response to my paper, "Brain Compatible Classrooms: Theory to Praxis," which I presented at the 1995 annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, demonstrated. During my presentation, I deliberately adopted the term "mind-brain" in order to avoid materialistic reductionism on one hand, and immaterial ungroundedness on the other. I was surprised by the reaction I received from my audience. It seemed that the room was divided in half. One group of the listeners took issue with what they perceived as a reductionistic bias, while the other

half opposed what they saw as overly philosophical or spiritual. It seemed that some reduced the term "mind-brain" to mean only "mind," while others misconstrued the term to mean exclusively "brain." Thus, in mutually contradictory fashion, I was accused of being both too ethereal and too materialistic. I left the presentation determined to understand this division in the audience. I realize now that my shift in terminology away from the common language, dualistic separation of "brain" and "mind" to the unity of "mind-brain" requires elaboration.

For this reason, an objective of this paper is to explore new metaphors from quantum physics which allow incorporation of both the physiological aspects of brain, as well as the philosophical/spiritual implications of mind. In this way, we can move toward a humanized neuroscience of the unified mind-brain. I hope to work toward a language that allows us to avoid the "either-or" separations of common language. I believe that metaphors from quantum physics can help overcome false separations and mistaken dualisms.

Metaphors for the Mind-Brain Unity

The common language of brain and mind is hampered by Cartesian dualism. The separation of mind versus body and brain is an essential premise of seventeenth-century Cartesian thought. Drew Leder (1990) states the case, "Cartesian categories of mind and body [brain] merely reify and segregate classes of experience that stand in ceaseless interchange" (p. 149). An integrated experience and understanding of mind-brain can generate new interpretations of our worlds that overcome separations of object and subject.

There are postmodern, alternative, non-objectified positions that challenge Cartesian dualism and its misunderstanding of the human mind and brain. One example is *biogenetic structuralism*, a view which "holds that 'mind' and 'brain' are two views of the same reality—mind is how brain experiences its own functioning, and brain provides the structure of mind" (Laughlin, McManus, and d'Aquili 1990, 13). This position is significant in the field of neurophilosophy. My use of the term *mind-brain*, based in biogenetic structuralism, allows me to explore and supersede the culturally imposed line between objectivity and subjectivity, matter and spirit, physiology and metaphysicality. Thus, biogenetic structuralism provides one possible bridge over Cartesian dualism. However, this bridge is difficult to sustain, as study tends to concentrate either on the physiological or the spiritual.

Likewise, Antonio Damasio (1994) presents a second alternative to Cartesian dualism: the *somatic-marker hypothesis* in which the body responds to both visceral and nonvisceral sensation through conscious or non-conscious images. In this view, when we are presented with a need to choose between alternatives, somatic-markers produce mental, emotional, and physiological changes in the state of the self. Favorable alternatives are met with corresponding pleasurable emotional and biological responses in our physiology, while "dangerous" or risky alternatives signal alarm and thereby initiate emotional and biological states related to "fight or flight" readiness.

Damasio (1994, 249-250) argues persuasively against *Descartes' Error*:

> the abyssal separation between body and mind, between the sizable, dimensioned, mechanically operated infinitely divisible body stuff, on the one hand, and the unsizable, undimensioned, un-pushpullable, nondivisible mind stuff; the suggestion that reasoning, and moral judgment, and the suffering that comes from physical pain or emotional upheaval might exist separately from the body.

In place of a dualistic conception of body and mind, Damasio presents a view of the mind that is dependent upon brain-body interactions for the "repeatedly reconstructed biological state" that we commonly call a self (Damasio 1994, 226-227). He states (1994, 252) in the conclusion of his book that "perhaps the most indispensable thing we can do as human beings, every day of our lives, is remind ourselves and others of our complexity, fragility, finiteness and uniqueness." He further notes that this is "a difficult and indispensable job indeed" (1994, 252). Even here though, the term *somatic-marker* brings more attention to the body (*soma*) than to the mental images (markers).

Therefore, I argue that because the terms used to explain our experience are dualistic and focus atten-

tion on distinctions (e.g., body as opposed to mind, physiology as opposed to emotions), maintaining a non-dualistic view of mind and body is difficult indeed. I maintain that we must change our language and metaphors to reflect a more integrated understanding of the self, mind-brain-body-emotions.

Such possible metaphorical bridges are found in metaphors drawn from quantum physics. I believe these bridges can be sustained over the long term. My choice of quantum metaphors is not arbitrary. Traditionally, we adopt metaphors from our most complicated discoveries and inventions to describe the functioning of our mind-brain. In previous centuries, we compared our brains to complicated machinery, such as clocks and automobiles. Presently, we adopt metaphors from computer technology, such as parallel processing and programming.

Although these metaphors have been useful, they perpetuate the false separations of brain and mind. Metaphors from quantum physics, another highly advanced field, can help us move beyond Cartesian dualism. Quantum physics has developed as a science to explain the world in opposition to Classical or Newtonian Physics.

While quantum physics is based on Einstein's theory of relativity, Newtonian physics is based on the Pythagorean assumption that reality can be reduced to mathematical relationships. Taking the lead from Descartes to "doubt everything," Newton proceeded to develop the laws of gravity and motion that have given "modern science a solid basis for the continual development which has since occurred" (Reese 1980, 389) and "permeated every aspect of European civilization" (Shlain 1991, 71). Indeed Newton's laws enabled scientific and technological developments ranging from the automobile to the computer. Even today, most of our interactions with the world are explained adequately for our purposes using Newtonian physics that frames our experience in dualistic terms of cause and effect and linear progression in time and space.

Quantum physics, on the other hand, has developed in response to the limits of Newtonian physics. These limits were most clearly encountered by scientists studying light. When studying light, scientists proved through experimentation that light is particle-like, however, other scientists through equally verifiable experimentation proved that light is wave-like (Zukav 1979; Gibbins 1987). In the worldview established through classical Newtonian physics light must be either particle-like or wave-like, but cannot be both since the definition of a wave is oppositional to the definition of a particle. The worldview of quantum physics developed in response to these and other similar scientific discoveries replacing the cause and effect linear and mechanistic models of Newtonian physics with models that reflect tendencies and probabilities.

In this way, twentieth-century quantum physics has changed and enriched the metaphors for human existence. Furthermore, quantum physics has shown that the metaphors we employ to explain and understand our mind-brains are especially important to the creation of our worlds. The metaphors from quantum physics that I seek to draw from are the participant-observer, fuzziness and exchange, and wave-particle unity.

The Metaphor of Quantum Participant-Observer

According to quantum theory, we participate in the creation of our realities through our status as participant-observers. Thus, a look at the metaphors we use to describe our selves is significant. As Deepak Chopra 1989, 130) notes,

> No matter where you look, the visible universe is fundamentally a set of signals. Yet these signals all hold together, turning totally meaningless vibrations into full-blown experiences that have human meaning.

The human act of using metaphors to attribute significance and value to these "meaningless vibrations" generates the world as we know it. This means that the use of metaphors and models creates our reality. In this way, the traditional understanding that we create models to explain what we observe in the world gives way to a quantum mechanical understanding that we create models as part of our participation in the creation and explanation of our worlds.

Also, the model of quantum physics informs us that the choice to measure certain properties actualizes those properties. All possibilities exist until we choose to measure or actualize a particular one (Wolf 1988). The models and metaphors which our understanding of the subatomic level generates allows the

creation of new metaphors to explain and create new ways of being. This metaphor of the participant-observer can allow us to envision a bridge between matter and spirit facilitating a more integrated understanding of our worlds. For example, our metaphors regarding the human body can be revised based upon these new metaphors generated by quantum physics. Rather than continuing to use outmoded Cartesian metaphors, we can metaphorize our worlds and bodies in quantum terms. Thus, the term *mind-brain* can take on a more significant and integrated meaning.

The shift from traditional classical mechanical metaphors of experience to quantum mechanical metaphors results in understanding the mind-brain as a participant-observer. Through this metaphor, the brain is no longer a separate entity *owned* by the Self and mind; instead, the mind and brain are understood as mind-brain, with integrated physical and metaphysical dimensions. The traditional split between subject and object is overcome through the participant-observer model. This metaphor allows the body to be experienced as presence. No longer a thing to be owned or observed, the body is understood as a complex part of the participant-observer unity which serves to actualize the world.

The participant-observer metaphor breaks down boundaries and encourages a view of the world in which discrete objects no longer exist. Instead, the emphasis shifts from the borders to a recognition of the constant exchange taking place everywhere and all of the time. For example, the transformation of food into thought by the mind-body demonstrates physicality transforming into metaphysicality.

The Metaphor of Quantum Fuzziness and Constant Exchange

The shift to quantum explanations and metaphors allows new understandings of the constant exchange of molecules and matter in and through the mind-brain. An emphasis on the changing conditions of the body and the brain, as well as the continual exchange between body and world, makes exclusive ownership of a singular body or brain impossible. If one were to "own one's body" within quantum metaphors, "one's body" or one's brain would have to include everything. Chopra (1989, 48-49) describes the body and brain using the metaphor of a quantum experience and process:

> If you could see your body as it really is, you would never see it the same way twice. Ninety-eight percent of the atoms in your body were not there a year ago. The skeleton that seems so solid was not there three months ago…. The skin is new every month. You have a new stomach lining every four days, with the actual surface cells that contact food being renewed every five minutes…. It is as if you lived in a building whose bricks were systematically taken out and replaced every year. If you keep the same blueprint, then it will still look like the same building. But it won't be the same in actuality. The human body also stands there looking much the same from day to day, but through the processes of digestion, elimination, and so forth, it is constantly and ever in exchange with the rest of the world.

Each system of the human body, including the brain, functions both separately and in union with the whole. Similarly, each of these particles and molecules, although involved in continual exchange, is also part of a synchronous and unified universe. The "fuzzy" boundaries and continual exchange recognized by and through quantum physics is also coupled with a connectedness between particles through which, "particles seem to know instantaneously what decisions are made elsewhere." (Zukav 1979, 72)

The universe has traditionally been described as a series of linear, cause-and-effect-type interactions. Now, however, we can borrow the metaphors of quantum physics and begin to think in terms of possibilities and non-linear exchanges which are constantly taking place. These metaphors can free us from the constraints of linear, cause-and-effect thinking. We can begin to recognize the continual multiplicity of reactions, possibilities and relationships that are formed and re-formed through simultaneous exchange.

An example of this constant exchange experienced in the world takes place in the breath. The body, if it is full of life, is always in motion—if only the motion of breathing. We are involved in a constant exchange of material and information between

ourselves, our bodies and our environments. Thus, in fact, the demarcation that we usually take for granted as separating the body from the environment is arbitrary.

The breath provides a relatively easy place from which to begin to integrate a quantum physical understanding into our way of thinking, and thereby broadening the metaphors within which we create and interpret our worlds. The activity of breathing creates a bridge transcending the physical and metaphysical. Where indeed do I begin and end in this process? What marks the boundaries of my world? What is it that gives and sustains my life? How does the breath, a physical transfer of molecules, accomplish the sustenance of life? These questions raise a dilemma for those caught within the Cartesian paradigm and sustain the impulse to move beyond this limiting interpretation of the world.

Classical physical metaphors of breathing generate a visualization of breathing in which air is taken in to the body and released. The very real processes of transformation are obscured in this account. A quantum mechanical explanation, however, draws our attention to the simultaneous responses of molecule to molecule. When metaphorized through quantum physics, the focus is drawn to the constant exchange of matter. The process of transformation from in-coming to out-going air becomes the center of attention. The life-giving integration and transfer of information takes on greater importance.

Considering the breath in quantum physical terms generates an enhanced understanding of the tension which exists between the physical and the metaphysical. While the physical dimensions of the process of breathing are understood in detail by practitioners of modern medicine, the metaphysical dimension remains elusive. The metaphors and models of quantum physics makes possible a new understanding of the transforming nature of breathing in a living body. One of the reasons that we have particular difficulty distinguishing mind and brain lies in this fact of exchange. As noted earlier, this constant exchange between self and environment proceeds largely unnoticed, yet it occurs at a remarkable rate. The metaphors generated through quantum physics makes it easier for us to imagine this constant exchange and overcome the Cartesian categorical divide.

Thus, understanding in great detail the physiology of brain function will not reveal the secrets of the mind. Instead, we must elaborate quantum metaphors of mind-brain in which 'mind' is not reduced to the material functioning of the 'brain.' Neither can 'brain' be properly studied alone. We must accept that the physiology we study is intimately related to — indeed inseparable from mind. The terms *mind* and *brain* are misleading and encourage the perpetuation of outmoded Cartesian dualism. The single term *mind-brain* will help us comprehend the interrelationship of mind-brain.

The Metaphor of Wave-Particle Unity

Another metaphor from quantum physics supports this position. The firm lines of demarcation between "here" and "there," "me" and "not me" have not been substantiated in the subatomic realm. Neils Bohr's principle of complementarity provides a pertinent example. The principle of complementarity postulates that "what we experience is not external reality, but our interaction with it" (Zukav 1979, 116). Bohr hypothesizes multiple "pictures" whose views are complementary and contradictory. In order to make sense of our observations, Bohr maintains that we need to consider pairs of pictures or metaphors, neither of which is complete on its own.

Discoveries related to light epitomize the complementary relationship Bohr was exploring. In 1803 Thomas Young, using the phenomenon of interference, proved that light is wavelike. Just over one hundred years later, in 1905, Albert Einstein, using the photoelectric effect, proved that light is particle-like. (Zukav 1979; Gibbins 1987) Thus, scientific evidence supported two contradictory conclusions regarding the nature of light.

Bohr's complementarity principle is an attempt to reconcile these two truths. By postulating that we understand light in terms of pairs of pictures or metaphors, Bohr was able to reconcile these two positions into a mutually supporting paradigm. Bohr maintained that in order to understand the nature of light, one must utilize the findings related to both observations, otherwise the account would be incomplete. Instead of insisting that light be understood in terms of *either* waves or particles, this principle of complementarity recognized that light is *neither*

wave nor particle, but *both* wave and particle (wave-particle). The "pictures" of waves and particles help us metaphorize and therefore better understand the behavior of the "more complex" entity, light, in terms of "less complex" observables, waves and particles.

As this example makes clear, light must be accepted, studied and metaphorized as wave-particle. Seemingly contradictory explanations and metaphors must be held simultaneously. Quantum physics shows the either/or position of classical Cartesian explanations are invalid.

The same is true of our mind-brain. Neuroscientists and educators alike continue to seek explanations of brain functioning without taking into account the seemingly contradictory information regarding mind. To continue to study the brain alone would be as misguided as treating light as either wave or particle. Just as light must be studied and metaphorized in complementary terms so that it may be understood, the inseparable concept of mind-brain must be accepted in order to avoid misguided theories and partial understandings of our selves.

Conclusion

I have discussed these three metaphors from quantum physics in order to develop parallels between the nondualistic understandings of quantum physics and those of neurophilosophy. The convergence between these areas of inquiry supports an emerging alternative to dualistic interpretations. The separations between matter and spirit, which were taken for granted by Descartes and many others following him, have come under serious attack in our century.

Quantum physics, the science of explaining the universe at its smallest, substantiates the elimination of dualistic interpretations of experience. The metaphors of quantum physics corroborate a more holistic interpretation of experience. The traditional dichotomies of objective and subjective, material and spiritual are challenged through these recent observations and discoveries.

Similarly, with regard to the neurophilosophy of the mind-brain, the different languages of materialism and spirituality unnaturally divide us into different camps. One group focuses strictly on understanding physiology, while the other focuses exclusively on understanding our "selves" apart from the physiological basis. Splitting ourselves into these disciplines enables only partial interpretations and incomplete analyses of the data available to us. The conclusions I have reached indicate that in order to generate a coherent analysis, which takes into account the wholeness of our human being, we must overcome the tendency to break down our communication. Utilizing the metaphors of quantum physics to sustain our bridge between matter and spirit, we must recognize the complementary interdependence of mind-brain.

As classroom teachers, we must remember that we do not exist as entirely separate and distinct individuals observing and controlling the learning environments of students. Rather, we are participant-observers in the learning-teaching process involved in continual dynamic exchanges between self the environment and other selves. Students in our classrooms are not empty vessels waiting to be filled, but active, emotional and physiological selves being continuously reconstructed in body, brain and mind. We too, as teachers, are active, emotional and physiological beings engaged in a similar process of continually reconstructing our selves. As we teach our students, we are also participating in the transformation of their selves and our selves. Thus, the third principle from quantum physics reminds us that the either/or, self/other dichotomies encouraged by the traditional Newtonian worldview must be dissolved, as we recognize the unity of wave-particle, brain-mind, self-other. The non-dualistic worldview encouraged through quantum physics lays bare the heart of education as a dynamic, interactive, and transformative engagement of self with others. This simple fact remains self-evident and yet often overlooked. Therefore, maintaining the bridge between traditional and technical language of neuroscience and the open-ended language of spirituality and philosophy is imperative. This bridge serves to keep us mindful of the grave importance of our task in the transformation of the self. Up to now, the major contribution of neuroscience research to education has been phenomenological rather than pedagogical. That is, neuroscience research can not yet prove one best strategy to reach all learners and no particular method of teaching can be shown to be better than

any other. Rather, the neuroscience findings to date substantiate the philosophical claim that the teacher-student relationship is central to all educational endeavors.

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Heinz Werner

Mapping the Territory Between Scientific and Poetic Understanding

Will Crosby

The psychologist Heinz Werner spoke for the romantic in all of us—the beleaguered, minimized, denied poetic understanding that is currently significantly shamed out of public discourse.

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Ever heard of Werner? Heinz Werner?

That question has become a bit like a mantra to me over these last few months, as I've picked the brains of various professors and practicing psychologists about their awareness of this developmental theorist. The response has been disappointing, spare the comic relief provided by its predictability: First a squint, then a blank look, and then—and this is where the consistency gets almost eerie—the report: "I *used* to know something about him. I know I've *heard* of him." Pause. "Boy, he's an old relic. Why do you want to know about *him*?"

Werner first appeared to me as an anomaly in one of the survey textbooks so ubiquitous in master's level graduate study. The chapter devoted to him was dense—studded with a whole lexicon of concepts that were foreign to me. But though his language was difficult to penetrate, and even antique, his ideas seemed refreshingly essential and inventive. In passing, I mentioned to a professor that I had found the chapter fascinating. She echoed that she too was taken with Werner's work, though she knew nothing more about him, and was unaware of any other literature that explored his ideas. I was intrigued. Who was this guy?

Later, I approached an advisor about him. The conversation yielded what I had yet to realize was the customary response—"I *used* to know something about him…"—as well as, after some searching, an unopened, yellowed copy of his tome, *Comparative Psychology of Mental Development*. A visit to the library turned up a few references, mostly in books which, despite being decades old, had virgin circulation cards tucked in the back.

A review of journals produced a smattering of more contemporary references. These were articles written by former students and colleagues of Werner's. They all made note of his virtual disappearance: "Werner seems to have precipitously faded from view" (Glick 1992, 558); "Werner's psychology may not have found a central place in the landscape" (Franklin 1990, 186); "Although a landmark in psychology, Werner's work has never permeated into the mainstream…" (McWhinnie 1985, 95); and—in the textbook in which I first discovered Werner—"Today Werner is frequently considered a historical relic" (Crain 1992, 97).

More striking, though, were these authors' unanimous, heartfelt references to Werner as an exceptional man whose work deserves to be remembered—and whose ideas have been overlooked not because they are obsolete, but because they are still too radical to be integrated into the culture.

> Those who knew Werner speak of the force of his intellect, his original vision, his encouragement to view problems from alternative standpoints, his willingness to stand apart from the mainstream, his openness to new ideas…. Clearly, those who worked with Werner and those who were his students found him inspiring. (Franklin 1990, 4)

> Those of us who trained with him or who occupied the same departmental space cannot treat him as a part of history. In some respects, Werner was a very modern thinker whose theoretical views were so at variance with normal professional practices that his message is yet to be heard. (Glick 1992, 7)

The portrait that emerges is of a small band of loyalists who found that studying with Werner opened their eyes to an understanding so compelling that, having been experienced, is difficult to forget. What is it that they've seen?

A Life Between Disciplines

Werner was born in Vienna in 1890. He began his university studies in engineering, but changed course soon after and entered the University of Vienna to pursue a career as a composer and music historian. One morning he attended what he supposed to be a music class and discovered that it was instead a lecture on the philosophies of Kant. Too embarrassed to walk out, by the end of class he found himself taken with what he heard—so much so that he eventually chose to major in the then-combined fields of philosophy and psychology. He eventually settled in Hamburg, where he taught and did research in an atmosphere of extraordinary intellectual depth. Throughout this time, he was a prolific author, completing a compelling series of articles addressing the objective and subjective aspects of perception. With titles such as *Basic Problems in the Psychology of Intensity* and *The Origins of the Metaphor*, his early writings revealed both a dogged willingness to explore the lilliputian mechanics of perception, and an original and powerful intellect capable of inferring sweeping principles of meaning and understanding. Throughout his life, Werner's work continued to combine this fascination with the organic principles of perception and their philosophical implications.

Werner immigrated to the United States as the Nazis rose to power. Although he was an accomplished author, professor, scientist and philosopher, his achievements were practically unrecognized here. He wasn't offered a full professorship again until 1947, when he was invited by Clark University to lead the psychology department—and his tenure there established him as a charismatic force within the field of psychology and forged the remarkable loyalty he enjoyed from students and colleagues alike. He worked there until his death in 1964.

Werner's approach at Clark revealed much about his ideas of science. He rejected the purist hypothesis-experiment approach universally in favor at the time—and was more interested in "probing" than in "proving." He wrote that

> when I became involved in the training of American students … I got rather apprehensive at finding that students were frequently taught that there was only one acceptable way of conduct in the laboratory…. What is missed here is the function of the scientist as a discoverer and explorer of unknown lands rather than only as a deductive methodologist. To be sure, hypotheses are essential elements of intellectual inquiry, not, however, as rigid propositions, but as flexible parts of the process of searching. By the

> same token, conclusions drawn from results are as much a beginning as an end. (Werner 1959, 331)

Reports of his teaching style confirm his open-minded approach. According to a former student at Clark, assigned readings were markedly wide-ranging, and included articles by Vygotsky and Piaget long before they were known to other American psychologists. A "democratic ethos" pervaded meetings and classes in an environment where "students were treated with unusual respect" and, "atypically for the time, women were regarded as the intellectual equals of men." Werner revelled in passionate discussion, with arguments sometimes turning into "shouting matches." His classroom had a charged atmosphere in which "we were engaged in battles about world views and the root metaphors of different theories" (Franklin 1990, 184).

Original Concepts

Werner's legacy of 15 books and 150 articles covers a vast intellectual territory. The topics to which he addressed himself are so wide-ranging and disparate that it is almost impossible to make a coherent summary of them. Still, there are meaningful consistencies—broad themes around which much of his work can be organized.

The Organismic Perspective

One essential theme emerges in Werner's ambitious determination to describe psychological experience as an integrated whole. He was adamant in his belief that psychological processes cannot be understood when abstracted from their context within the integrated totality of an organism—a stance he labeled "organismic." Werner's concern was that his theory

> embody in its conceptual approach some manner of recognizing and dealing with the phenomenon of "completeness" that organisms show. The completeness condition is simply a way of recognizing that human organisms are multiform, multileveled beings, blending splendid rationalities and equally splendid incoherences. (Glick 1983, 38)

A consequence of his organismic perspective was his outright rejection of the possibility that consciousness can be understood by being fractured into a collection of attributes, and then "measured." In this, he took the opposite view of his best-known contemporary, Piaget, who built a career out of measuring the development of elements of cognition. Without naming Piaget, Werner took pains to point out the limitations of his approach.

Werner perceived attributes such as, say, "logic," as "surface structures": externally identified and measured phenomenon that may not in fact reflect "inner structures" in any meaningful way (Glick 1983). He felt that measuring these surface structures could actually obscure our understanding of psychology—and that to do so was not a true investigation of "the structure of actual living thought" but "merely a demonstration of how far the [subject] can go in reconstructing the intellectual models of the logician" (Werner 1948, 22). It was his idea that logic and other surface structures were not so much structures as they were *effects*—consequences of groups of interacting inner structures, subject to conditioning.

Werner's work is full of deceptively humble illustrations of this belief. One was based on ordinary blackboard chalk. He pointed out that we commonly consider chalk to be white. Of course, in reality, the color and brightness of chalk is infinitely variable, depending on illumination. Our working illusion that chalk is a single, static color is an example of the outer structure of "perceptual constancy"—an externally measurable given, akin to other measurable structures such as logicalness.

Werner set out to show that, as real a phenomenon as perceptual constancy may seem to be, there is in reality no single inner structure that correlates to it. As proof, he demonstrated experimentally that perceptual constancy is constructed of at least three unrelated inner structures. The first, and crudest, is the adjustment of our retina to different lighting conditions. The second is an involuntary psychological tendency towards perceiving "constancy" that develops throughout childhood, finally reaching its peak at about age 15. The third is a mature tendency to view the world conceptually, and then to exclude information that clouds or conflicts with those concepts. In the case of chalk, we adopt the concept "white"—and then overlook conflicting sensory evidence (Werner 1937).

His simple example had far-reaching implications. In an era in which psychologists were obsessed with creating a useful road map of the human psyche, Werner came out with the revelation that much of what they were so busily measuring might simply be culturally projected structures. His implicit valuing of inner over outer life was not without precedent—psychologists had been concerned with it for decades—but his interest in expressing that valuing in science-based language offered a particularly pointed challenge to his behavior-focused peers.

Developmental Concepts

The process of development absorbed Werner, and it this area of his work for which he is best remembered. He was again at odds with his contemporaries, who he dismissed as holding the "older view":

> According to the older view, the development from childhood to manhood was conceived to be the quantitative unfolding of potentialities, of qualities present latently … one had only to subtract certain capacities from the mentality of the adult in order to arrive at more primitive beings. The entire older conception of development is governed by this mechanistic idea of subtracting or adding qualities, a procedure in diametric opposition to an organic understanding of the problem at hand. (Werner 1948, 22)

Here Werner reveals his frustration with the same adult-centrism that he found unacceptable in the basis for Piaget's measurements. He believed that development was not best understood as growth along a continuum, because the definition of the continuum itself would be defined by those evaluating the growth. Instead, he proposed that each developmental level

> represents a new entity with respect to the one preceding it, and is understandable in terms of itself…. Any level, however primitive it may be, represents… a self-subsisting totality. (Werner 1948, 22)

Taken as an abstract concept, this approach seems hardly earth-shaking, but when one considers that Werner used this as a guiding principle in conducting research, its radicalness starts to emerge. Basically, he committed himself precociously to the postmodern doctrine that researchers must consider their own position relative to that which they are studying—"so that one must not only account for the laws of the entity… but one must also account for the processes of 'entification' that form the entities into the things that are then studied" (Glick 1992, 560). It is a position that enormously complicates the task of research and the responsibilities of the "understander," which ultimately led Werner to frame a new paradigm of the nature of development. He redefined development—again, in deceptively simple terms—as merely the progression from a "state of relative globality and lack of differentiation to a state of increasing differentiation, articulation, and hierarchic integration" (Werner 1957, 109).

Development, in Werner's broad model, is an immutable given—an implicit fact of life. In a sense, then, it becomes the researcher's job to *assume* development, and then to determine how—rather than whether—it has occurred. Werner rejected the idea that development is a phenomenon that must occur along a predetermined axis, measured according to a preconceived set of variables. The task of developmental psychologists is not to *find* development—because it is ubiquitous—but to *define* it in terms that are wholly relevant to the developing organism, and profound enough to describe it adequately.

To Werner, studying development in this way would not "predict developmental courses in their specificity" (Werner 1957, 112). It offered instead an approach to understanding organisms that transcended the traditional measurement-focused models—an approach in which subjects would not be reduced to the known, but that would, in fact, reveal the *un*known.

Werner's concern was in finding ways to characterize the essence of an organism's experience, dynamically, as witnessed through their development. Of course, existing language, especially scientific language, posed a significant impediment. How does one characterize the state of another organism, without resorting to clumsy, static comparisons—which are inherently a kind of reductive measurement? Werner created in his work a "fundamentally new theoretical language—a language that did not freeze itself into a mold appropriate to only to a segregated function." This was a "vectorial language; a language of forces, of dynamic tendencies" com-

posed not of "entities of structure (e.g., operations), but of states of connection and organization" (Glick 1983, 49).

With this "vectorial language," Werner sought to capture the universal principles of development and of the organization of experience itself. In many ways, his goals were more closely aligned with those of poets and artists than with those of traditional researchers. Perhaps not surprisingly, then, his work is laced to a rare degree with "the language of intimate experience, art and metaphor" (Glick 1983, 49).

The Syncretic State

The state of un-development particularly fascinated Werner. Having defined development as "differentiation, articulation, and hierarchic integration," un-development was then characterized as a state in which thought, emotion, and body-sensation was not differentiated but fused. He dubbed this state "syncretic."

In order to understand the nature of syncreticism, he did extensive studies with populations he considered to be in varying states of undevelopment. He felt inclusiveness was essential in order to glean a far-reaching understanding of syncreticism, and so in his search for subjects he cast a wide net. Predictably, it included children, but it also included animals, and adults in "primitivized states": brain-damaged and psychotic individuals, indigenous populations, artists, and people under the influence of drugs and alcohol. Werner wasn't the first to study some of these populations—Paul Klee, Hans Prinzhorn, and Carl Jung were among those who preceded him. But Werner's comparative studies with these groups were uniquely systematic and comprehensive, and yielded a fascinating, sensitively written record.

Werner acknowledged that there were great differences between the populations that he studied, and was vigilant in detailing them, but he also found significant commonalities that formed the basis for his depiction of syncretic experience. He described it as a "poetic" reality, a "magic" understanding in which the entire world is an expressive place, infused with feeling and meaning (Werner 1948). "Sensing" overtakes "thinking," implying the body's important place in syncreticism, and suggesting its aesthetically saturated nature.

One consequence of this feeling-infusion is that every aspect of an experience takes on the "quality-of-the-whole," which is the very essence of syncreticism. A young child, for example, becomes afraid not only of a spider but also of its web, and "believes" that the web is capable of inflicting a painful bite (Werner 1948). Keepsakes and souvenirs derive their sentimental value through this kind of syncretic association—more than mere reminders, they take on the quality of being a small "piece" of a larger event. No part of a reality can be can be imagined in isolation from its totality.

Perhaps syncreticism's most striking feature is the tremendous blurring that occurs in the subject-object relationship; there is a distinct reduction of the usual polarity between self and surroundings relative to "logical" understanding. This extends to inanimate objects, which take on symbolic significance, and even seem to have an inner life themselves as they are "no longer evaluated in their pure objectivity, but …in terms of the affective drives of the person" (Werner 1948, 81). The subject enters into *relationship* with every aspect of their world—not with the detached I/it orientation of rational awareness, but instead with an I/thou reciprocity based on the assumption that both parties have a will. At its simplest, it explains why sometimes a chair seems to "invite" us to sit down, or a tree root "intends" to stub our toe.

In a sense, syncreticism diminishes individual agency through this externalization of will, as the subject perceives themselves at the mercy of surroundings that are completely "alive." It paints the world as an unpredictable place that—with the fluid variability of inner emotion—can never be mastered or controlled through the manipulation of universal laws.

At the same time, agency is also enhanced by the perhaps subliminal perception that the external world is a reflection of inner life. One specific result is that the world becomes manipulable through wishfulness. "Other" is magically vulnerable to the will of "self." This may occur in an explicit form, such as "willing" someone to feel a certain way or to commit a particular act, or in more global and diffuse

ways. A sunny day, for instance, may seem "made to order" as a perfect reflection of an especially happy mood (Werner 1948).

More broadly, though, the syncretic world is one in which the subject is always embedded in a meaningful universe. Because experience is taken in as whole and complete, free from deconstructive analysis, it is charged with a sense of inevitability, and consequently with significance. The existentialists' descriptions of the empty, godless psychic landscape of modern life are the absolute antithesis of syncreticism: In the florid, sense-soaked syncretic "reality," god—many gods—are very much alive and well. This embeddedness rescues the syncretic being from even the possibility of looking at themselves "objectively"—as well as from the rewards and devastations of that perspective. Though they live in an unpredictable and uncontrollable world, they have the comfort of believing that they are at the center of it.

Reason does exist there, though it is not reason as we would recognize it. It is, depending on one's perspective, accurately or crazily absent of linearity. Much as in a dream, conflicting beliefs can be held simultaneously without conflict. A stone can be known both as a mineral and a living presence. A stranger can be a sister or brother. All of reality can enroll in multiple parts in a drama in which relationships and categories are as rich and labile as the imagination.

Physiognomic Perception

Although Werner focused on a specific set of populations in his explorations of syncreticism, he acknowledged that the phenomenon could also be found abundantly (albeit in less spectacular forms) in the "normal" adult Western psyche. He felt that although we perceive ourselves as rational and objective, we in fact move back and forth between a rational and a syncretic perspective, leaving us in a state he called "stratified."

> The same individual in Western culture may function, now with the advanced categories and operations of the scientist, now with the more undifferentiated operations of the [primitive mind]. (Werner 1948, 93)

In identifying syncreticism as a part of adult Western experience, Werner appears to have sought to liberate it from the stigma associated with the label of "undeveloped." As a consequence, it seems, he retitled it in a way that would normalize it by emphasizing its expressive, aesthetic qualities. He chose the name "physiognomic perception," because he believed (in what seems to me to be a rare lapse into sentimentalism) that the human face is the one thing we are incapable of perceiving in a purely rational way.

> Because human physiognomy is the outstanding paradigm of an object perceived universally as an expressive entity, I have proposed the term "physiognomic perception" for this general mode of cognition. (Werner 1957, 281)

Much of his discussion of physiognomic perception focuses not on its developmental immaturity but on its special, poetic qualities. It can best be described perhaps as a kind of full-spectrum perception—in which one is sensitive to the expressive and emotional qualities inherent in a phenomenon.

Werner distinguished physiognomic perception from mere projection or anthropomorphism and was frustrated by his peers' dismissal of it as such. Projection occurs from the subject outward to the object and is essentially *imagined*. In physiognomic perception, on the other hand, the subject is receptive to real qualities that exist within the object. To prove his point, Werner conducted experiments in which he showed participants drawings of simple curved lines. Regardless of their reported affective states, participants interpreted various lines as "happy" or "sad" or "excited" with remarkable consistency. Hence, Werner said, they were responding to qualities inherent in the stimuli and demonstrated that they were doing much more than simply "projecting" their own state of mind (Werner 1948).

Werner also implicated physiognomic perception in an intriguing corollary to his ideas about development that he called "microgenesis." According to Werner, adults recapitulate the developmental process in microcosmic form each time they are confronted with a new task. In other words, each time we recognize an object, attack a problem, or respond to a question, we move first from a state of generalized, physiognomic perceptions that are charged

with feelings to a more differentiated, "logical" state. This process occurs so quickly and automatically that it is unrecognized. It becomes more visible in particularly stressful situations, such as navigating a dark room or a new city, or facing the aftermath of a tragedy such as a car accident (Crain 1992).

The Place of Creativity

Although Werner believed that physiognomic perception largely disappears from adult conscious awareness, he seemed undecided about whether this was an inevitable or even healthy process. Though he characterizes it as the developmental precursor to a "geometric-technical" awareness—his term for differentiated, developed thought—he was careful to point out that it has value in its own right. In a brief essay in which he compares physiognomic with geometric-technical understanding, he admonishes that "the important point is to recognize the uniqueness, the irreducibility of each of the two modes of perception" (Werner 1957, 281). He is even more explicit in this criticism of his peers:

> The preoccupation with the behavior and the world of advanced, specifically, technical and scientific man has hindered psychologists' seeing that there is more than one mode of perception; it has blinded them from recognizing a mode of perception radically different than the one by which things are grasped in terms of their 'geometric-technical,' matter-of-fact qualities. (Werner 1957, 280)

Werner devoted a considerable amount of attention to the essential contribution physiognomic perception makes towards creativity, and went so far as to declare that "one must be able to return to less differentiated modes of … thought if one is to be able to break the the bounds of a fixed way of looking at things" (Werner 1956, 94). Art itself—highly valued by Werner—requires physiognomic perception. He quoted Wassily Kandinsky on several occasions to illustrate examples of physiognomic perception, and its essential role in artistry:

> …As a thirteen- or fourteen-year-old boy I bought a box of oil-colors with pennies slowly and painfully saved. To this very day I can still see the colors coming out of the tubes. One press of my fingers and jubilantly, festively, or grave and dreamy, or turned thoughtfully within themselves, the colors came forth. Or wild with sportiveness, with a deep sigh of liberation, with the deep tone of sorrow, with splendid strength and fortitude, with yielding softness and resignation, with stubborn self-mastery, with a delicate uncertainty of mood—out they came, these curious, lovely things called colors. (Kandinsky 1913, 17)

And so, having outlined the physiognomic-into-geometric-technical developmental progression, Werner amended it with the possibility of chosen regression. "The more creative the person…," he wrote, "the greater his capacity to utilize primitive as well as advanced operations" (Werner 1957, 145 as cited in Crain 1992). In a sense, the highest form of development is achieved when one can freely move between these two modes of perception—which parallel contemporary ideas about "the two sides of the brain"—*at will*. Without this duality, one will not be able to "be creative in art or science, or to attain adequate interpersonal relationships, or to enjoy art, poetry, humor, or to enjoy the world in any way afresh. In this sense," Werner writes in an echo of Picasso's famous quote about spending a lifetime to become a child, "'The child is perpetually the father of the man'" (Werner 1956, 94).

Werner's Precipitous Fall

As has been noted, Werner has largely disappeared from discourse—and prematurely, according to his loyalists. An autopsy of Werner's career reveals several possible contributing factors. Depending on one's perspective, his fall can be perceived as a lesson in the pragmatics of scientific fame or as a more far-reaching comment on cultural dynamics.

Piaget is lauded as Werner's best-known contemporary—the very embodiment of success and longevity. The differences in their approach are instructive when trying to understand Werner's failure to inspire a broad-based following. First and foremost, perhaps, was Werner's failure to create a narrow niche for himself. While Piaget focused on a "methodologically isolated … set of functions," Werner "took as his unit of analysis the concept of development itself and sought to trace developmental

changes…in broader terms" (Glick 1992, 559). As a result, Werner wrote widely and touched speculatively on an incredible number of subjects. He consequently could never be known for a single "portfolio" of theories. The sheer breadth of his inquiry makes him a textbook writer's nightmare, and very difficult to put into a concise, memorable package. To make matters worse, Werner didn't articulate his ideas in the same terms as his contemporaries, which presumably made it easier for them to simply overlook him (Franklin 1990).

Also damaging to Werner was his abstractness. While the world around him focused on hard variables such as behavior and cognition, Werner wrote abstrusely (and with an almost total lack of definitive conclusions) about "inner nature." He identified no formal developmental stages, no predictive tests—little, in fact, that would be useful in controlling or predicting behavior at all. Even Werner's advocates acknowledge he is "abstract and difficult" (Crain 1983, 97), and have gone so far as to hint that his work is insufficiently concrete to constitute a true theory at all, or that if it does, it is a theory "on the 'grand scale'" (Glick 1992, 562)—and so at odds with traditional developmental psychology as to be better suited for "philosophical and literary journals" (Glick 1992, 561).

His relaxed ideas about research—in which he suggested that empiricism was but one of several legitimate models for inquiry—did nothing further to endear him to a field eager to justify itself as a true science. His implied assumption that development is a heuristic phenomenon must have further challenged the field's sense of self-importance, which, as in other sciences, rests in large part on the assumption that it is in the business of uncovering objective truth. And chances are that his implicit and explicit criticisms of colleagues and his complaints about the field's "preoccupation" with a "technical" perspective, did nothing further to enhance his standing (Werner 1957, 280).

Still, as is the case with all iconoclasts, the tables can be turned—and Werner's work can be used as a vantage point for evaluating the field in which he worked. Werner was exceptional in that he didn't constrain his attention to ideas that would be immediately useful, or even acceptable. In this, he aligns himself with some of the greatest thinkers both within and without psychology, including Freud, Jung, and others who postulated about inner psychic life. His approach is especially unusual in developmental psychology, in that he never seeks to wrestle the unknown into submission—but instead comes to it with a willing wonder and an interest in capturing the essence of it, complete and in its wholeness. In a manner very much like Jung, he hypothesized structures in an effort to describe these whole phenomenon that he recognized through his open-mindedness. In a field "which is eager to know about the 'whole child' but is only prepared to listen to the news as a catalog of its parts" (Glick 1983, 51), his is a rare and not altogether welcome perspective. "Perhaps this explains why Piaget, who has, perhaps, the least to say about the child as a natural, ethnographic, or 'whole' being, is so much listened to" (Glick 1983, 51).

Of course, Werner appears less radical from our postmodern perspective—and it's easy to imagine that he has not enjoyed a renaissance because a few of his ideas seem downright musty in the present cultural context. In particular, some of his studies of "primitive" peoples would raise hackles. He faced criticism for his use of the word "primitive" in his own lifetime and, though he defended himself in an essay he wrote in 1957, his response "perhaps came too late, and in any case, was not widely heard" (Franklin 1990, 186). Indeed, though he was careful never to belittle the "primitive perspective"—and in fact seems almost beguiled by it—there are a few instances of relatively benign but overt racism in his writings. Though that in itself is enough to consign him to history, perhaps it should not be so. For Werner has done as much as anyone to bring about the intellectual dethroning of the Western perspective. He was a harbinger, and implicit proselytizer, of cultural openness.

Room for Development

The degree to which Werner challenged rationalism was certainly unusual for his day, particularly for a theorist in the realms of science and psychology. Still, he never abandoned the position that "full development" requires command of the geometric-technical perspective, with at most *elective* "regres-

sions" into syncreticism. In other words, the seat of developmental maturity rested firmly in Western rationality: He never seriously entertained the possibility that an individual embedded in a syncretic reality could be considered fully developed. This position raises several important issues.

The Politics of "Development"

These days we are generally more attuned to the delicate power issues involved in the application of a word like "developed," which though clothed in the "neutrality" of science, fairly drips with judgment. It's not surprising that a white Western psychologist, albeit a singularly open one, would assume that a geometric-technical perspective was an essential component of complete human development. Imagine the outrage had he claimed that it had in fact no place in development. I raise this point not merely as an exercise in exploring the limits of political correctness, but because, in fact, a good case can be built that a geometric-technical perspective is not an end-point of development, but merely a cultural predilection.

In a fascinating study entitled *The Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man*, five cultural anthropologists point out that "primitive" populations who have contact with Western culture tend to reject adopting it. Werner himself observed this tendency, but dismissed it as evidence of the "rigidity" of syncreticism (Werner 1948). These five anthropologists—peers of Werner's, incidentally—make a case that primitive populations reject Western culture on more sophisticated grounds than most of us imagine.

> The basic distinction of modern thought is that between subjective and objective. On this distinction scientific thought has based a critical and analytical procedure by which it progressively reduces the individual phenomenon to typical events subject to universal laws. Thus it creates an increasingly wide gulf between our perception of the phenomenon and the conceptions by which we make them comprehensible. We see the sun rise and set, but we think of the earth as moving around the sun. We see colors, but we describe them as wavelengths…. Even if we individually are unable to prove these almost unbelievable scientific views to be true, we accept them, because we know they can be proved to possess a greater degree of objectivity than our sense-impressions. (Frankfort et al. 1946, 11)

The "primitive" mind, according to the authors, would "not be satisfied by our ideas."

> Primitive thought naturally recognized the relationship of cause and effect, but … not our view of an impersonal, mechanical, and lawlike functioning of causality…. It looks, not for the "how," but for the "who," when it looks for a cause. (Frankfort et al. 1946, 15)

In other words, these populations have an equally coherent mode of perception as our own and reject adopting our culture not out of ignorant obstinance or "rigidity" but out of the same loyalty to their experience that we feel to ours. They *prefer* physiognomic perception—it has meaning to them that they cannot find in the geometric-technical perspective. Even Native Americans who fully assimilate into the Western lifestyle frequently abandon it—not out of an inability to manage it, but an *unwillingness* to (Mander 1991).

It is easy to see how a seemingly innocent concept such as "development" can be invoked—with all good intentions—with the express effect of valuing one way of thinking over another. It is difficult when applying any kind of directional scale, even one as broad-minded as Werner's, not to use it to make what amounts to a global evaluation—for the simple reason that it is the evaluator who created the scale. What theorist has ever advanced an evaluative measure that she or he would not be at the top of?

"Geometric-Technical" as the Power Language

Though a lot has changed since Werner was conceiving his theories, not everything has. Geometric-technical is still more than "a mode of perception"—it is, in fact, the language of power. In law, in finance, in politics, in all of the most respected and best remunerated lines of work, "geometric-technical" only need apply. Those inclined to a more poetic apprehension are relegated, effectively, to the status of second-class. And of course, that population includes far more than displaced indigenous people. Women, minorities, artists—and indeed all the populations that Werner identified alternately as suffering from and excelling at syncreticism—are either by nature

or by design denied the lion's share of the spoils of our geometric-technical-loving culture.

It may be that these groups are inherently physiognomically inclined, or as Jean Baker Miller (1986, 21) points out, the dynamic may be the reverse:

> …as a society emphasizes and values some aspects of the total range of human potentials more than others, the valued aspects are associated closely with, and limited to, the dominant group's domain. Certain other elements are relegated to subordinates. Although these may be necessary parts of human experience, they are not the ones valued by that particular society. Furthermore, subordinates cannot easily call attention to this distribution.

That is, having been denied access to the rewards of power, these marginalized groups seek out alternative modes of understanding, much as a second child might unconsciously fashion a personality distinctly different than his or her older sibling who has already been integrated into the family. By creating an alternative culture, minorities shift the paradigm by which they value themselves—so they can perceive themselves as having worth in a world that has, in a very significant way, rejected them.

Whatever the dynamic, the geometric-technical paradigm will rule the culture as long as it is perceived as the "correct" one. As a consequence, there is significant investment in maintaining that perception. A vast network of cultural behaviors may be designed to protect the status quo in that regard, from the systematic desensitization of boys to the gargantuan marketing machine devoted to convincing us that technology will solve all of our problems (even in the face of mounting evidence that it is creating them at a far faster rate).

Miller's point is well made. Few would say that there is no place for the unique contributions of women, or of, say, artists, but that doesn't translate into equitable treatment for those groups. As long as we discount, as individuals, our own physiognomic perceptive abilities as in any way essentially inferior to our logical thought, the groups who hold the syncretic space in the culture will also be discounted. Put more simply, a culture that prizes geometric-technical experience will reward its engineers and lawyers, but a culture that prizes syncretic experience will reward its artists and parents. A wonderful account that gives a hint of what such a shift might look like comes from a former student of Werner's, who in her own writings has redesignated physiognomic perception as "aesthetic perception," and geometric-technical perception as simply "mundane" (Barten 1983).

The Illusion of Objectivity

It seems highly plausible that "*un*syncretic" experience is actually an oxymoron. Is it really possible for humans to perceive in a way that is not "fused with emotion?" Certainly we in the West are accustomed to *denying* the emotional, sensory nature of our much of our experience, but that doesn't in any way suggest we can actually *turn it off*. It appears to me that we fulfill our imperative to appear "above emotion" through relentless conditioning, more than through any real genesis into a place of such intellectual purity that we are actually untouched by the vagaries of feeling.

Despite Werner's respect for syncreticism, he stated unequivocally that "emotions become intellectually controlled" (Werner 1948, 56b). Even today, this is the perspective most reassuring to modern Westerners, who have staked so much on the development of *mind*. But unless by "control" he means the rather course mechanisms of repression and denial, he may be at risk of reversing the relationship of horse and cart. It is just as defendable a position to claim that "thoughts are emotionally controlled"—for emotion creates the entire context of meaning in which thoughts are pursued.

Perhaps the apt metaphor is not horse and cart, but chicken and egg—for thought and feeling really are inseparably wedded halves of a circular continuum. In such an entangled relationship, it's difficult to imagine "pure" thought, or much of anything at all isolated enough to be "pure." This suggests an amendment to Werner's ideas is needed, in which the false polarity between the various perceptive modes is diminished. For just as our physiognomic perceptions give rise, ultimately, to the direction and shape of our intellectual pursuits, so too even our most esoteric intellectual discoveries become em-

bedded in the fabric of our understanding through syncretic integration.

Relic, or Relevant?

It is difficult to imagine that Werner will ever enjoy much of a revival. As several authors have pointed out, academic references to his work have tapered to a trickle. Still, he is not really lost to us. A good number of his ideas—whether through him or other like-minded theorists—have been absorbed into the culture. In fact, so much has changed to reflect Werner's approach and thinking, it is hard to know what his contribution *wasn't*. He laid the groundwork, or at least named the groundwork, for many aspects of postmodernism, holism, humanism, and even psychology's current multicultural focus and interest in quantitative research.

Still, there is much in his understanding that has yet to be heard. If it is true that "theories of development are often the battleground for differing conceptions of the nature of [humankind]" (Glick 1983, 36), then Werner's work proposes a conception radically at odds with that of his contemporaries—and one that is still largely unassimilated. He was a scientist who risked assigning himself the task of understanding the poetic aspects of human nature and who set about characterizing them in a way that bridged the gap between logician and artist. The result was a unique body of literature that uses the "power language" of rationalism to appreciate and so to validate creativity and artistry, with uncommon depth.

More than teaching us what we don't know, Werner gave new means for valuing the "intuitive" understandings that we already have. Much of intuitive human experience has been minimized in the West as intrinsically "flawed"—a weak, primordial precursor to logic and rationality. Werner rescued these aspects of human character from the intellectual orphanage where they've been abandoned, and created a place for them in our formal understanding of human nature.

It's conceivable that this cross-paradigm approach denied Werner his place in history. As the proximate intellectual audience for his work, other scientists may have been nonplussed at his explorations of physiognomic perception—and, quite literally, may not have been able to recognize their significance. In the foreword to one of his books, a fellow psychologist writes that Werner "deals precisely with the kind of mental life that scientists do not have, and, not having, tend to overlook" (Allport 1948, xi). On the other hand, the artists and poets who would have been receptive to the content of his work may not have known of him, or perhaps couldn't penetrate his scientific language and concepts.

While his approach may have cost him lasting fame, it is of note that it did not cost him a place in the minds and hearts of those who knew him. He is still championed by them, as though a cause. I can only speculate that their lasting loyalty is inspired by their recognition of his unique intellectual journey, and perhaps by the possibility he held out of revaluing large parts of personal understanding routinely dismissed by the cultural insult "intuitive."

This seemed confirmed in a phone call with Bill Crain, the author of the textbook in which I originally discovered Werner. Asked why he continued to include a chapter on Werner long after he had been excised from other textbooks, Crain said, "Well, I'm a romantic." And that, perhaps, points to Werner's real contribution: He spoke for the romantic in all of us—the beleaguered, minimized, denied poetic understanding that is significantly shamed out of public discourse.

As Crain (citing the social critic Roszak) points out in his book,

> we have translated mental life into flow charts and decision trees, and we have made precision, objectivity, and rationality our ultimate goals…. We have cut ourselves off from the fluid world of dreams, emotions, and intuitions, and the organic rhythms of the body. Simultaneously, we have lost our feeling for nature, reducing her to mere physical matter to be exploited and controlled … to such an extent that we are startled when anxious ecologists remind us that our survival still depends on air, water, soil, plants, and animals. (Crain 1992, 98)

Indeed, it is possible to speculate that the resurrection of an appreciation of physiognomic perception may be essential for more than complete, integrated experience. It may be that our current flirtation with environmental disaster can only be reversed if we can hear, culturally, a voice other than that of so-

called geometric-technical "reason"—a prospect that makes reason suspect indeed as an unbiased arbiter of reality.

In any case, it seems evident that Werner's voice will not be the one to open the culture. As with any marginalized perspective, however, fame is not a fair measure of success. Without a doubt, Werner broke new ground with his unprecedented enterprise. At the very least, it's safe to say that his work offers an important warming fire in the chilly landscape of rationality to anyone interested in intuitive perception and poetic understanding.

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Book Reviews

The Heart of the Matter: Teacher Educators and Teacher Education Reform

by Andra Cole, Elijah Rosebud, and Gary Knowles

Published by Caddo Gap Press (San Francisco), 1998.

Reviewed by Liza Finkel

Over the past several years Americans have been bombarded with reports on the state of their public education system and proposals for its reform. Spurred on once again by President George W. Bush's proposal to "Leave No Child Behind," newspaper headlines, radio broadcasts, and television news programs have focused their attention on the current crisis in American education and on the preparation of teachers for America's schools. These proposals have clear messages for the schools of education in which many of these teachers are prepared. With their emphasis on the need to provide quality teachers for failing schools, they suggest that teacher education programs lack intellectual rigor, often because of their emphasis on instructional processes over subject matter content, and are thus ineffective at preparing teachers to teach. They also imply that it is teacher educators themselves who are to blame for this situation (p. 16).

While many people in and outside of teacher education would agree that there is a need for change in the ways that teachers are educated, few of the newest, but still shopworn, proposals provide much in the way of substantive recommendations, offering only externally mandated content standards and increased testing to improve the quality of America's teachers. *The Heart of the Matter*, a collection of essays about reform in teacher education edited by Ardra Cole, Rosebud Elijah, and Gary Knowles, provides us with a broader and more humane vision of what teacher education programs, and teacher educators, can aspire to become.

The Heart of the Matter has its roots in the Summer 1996 issue of *Teacher Education Quarterly*, which highlighted the "apparent conflict between individual efforts and commitments to reform and institutional contexts which generally militate against change in favor of preserving the status quo" (pp. 10-11). This text extends that original conversation, focusing on "the intersection between teacher educators and the contexts within which they work," while at the same time looking more closely at "a particular kind of reform effort, the self-study of teacher education practices" (p. 11). In addition to including essays originally published in the 1996 journal issue, *The Heart of the Matter* includes some new essays, modifications or additions to some of the original papers, and responses to these essays by deans and other "senior, reform-minded educators" (p. 12).

The book is organized into four sections in which teacher educators "explore various perspectives on teacher education and its reform, individual efforts and experiences associated with changes in teacher education, and the university contexts within which teacher educators work and teacher education reform is partially situated" (p. 9). Each section of the book focuses on a different aspect of the role of self-study research in teacher education reform and provides its readers with a clearer understanding of both the efforts and challenges faced by innovative teacher educators.

Part I, "The Reform Context," consists of a single essay by Gary Knowles and Ardra Cole in which they provide a framework for the rest of the book by describing and analyzing the current landscape of teacher education reform. Documenting several decades of change in teacher education, Knowles and Cole provide both a useful history and a cogent critique. While acknowledging that schools of education do their work "in a maelstrom of political, public, and internal pressures to improve the way teachers are prepared" (p. 21), they are explicitly critical of

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the lack of support provided by such schools for their teacher education faculty, who are faced with the dilemma of conforming to the culture and standards of the traditional research university, while also seeking to establish and sustain collaborative relationships with teachers and administrators in public K-12 schools. Using Kerr's distinction between *reform,* "something someone wants to do in relation to a set of values," and *response*, "something someone must do in response to the situation" (cited in Knowles and Cole, p. 30), Knowles and Cole suggest that "while many beginning professors strive to *reform* teacher education, many schools of education are engaged in *response* efforts" (p. 30, emphasis added).

Parts II and III of *The Heart of the Matter* seek to offer a foundation for understanding the various ways in which self-study research can be an effective vehicle for teacher education reform. Continuing their critique of schools of education in the first essay in Part II, Ardra Cole and Gary Knowles describe the goals and purposes of self-study research, and review and analyze the way it is perceived by other educational researchers. As they document the experiences of self-study researchers denied tenure because of the low status of their research methods and topics of study, it becomes clear that to be engaged in self-study research, and hence in this approach to teacher education reform, is far from a risk-free choice for early career teacher educators.

The self-study projects described in these two sections range widely in content and form. The studies include, among others, an analysis of the correspondence of three former colleagues who explore the way that their life experiences had and had not prepared them to work with the students they found at their new institutions (Abt-Perkins, Dale, & Hauschildt); a beginning faculty member's examination of the contrasts between her preparation as a teacher educator and her actual experiences as a first year faculty member (Elijah); a self-described "new teacher educator" who views teaching as social activism and who rewrites the rules for success at her institution as she chooses to "teach against the grain" (McCall); and a report from the "Arizona Group," four educators who "account for the tensions and balance between what colleges of education and teacher educators are and should be, the personal/professional elements of our lives, and how we negotiated our experience in the academy without losing sight of our commitments and beliefs" (Guilfoyle, Hamilton, Pinnegar, and Placier, p. 171).

The articles in these two sections provide an intimate illustration of the perils and possibilities of self-study research, as well as a clearer sense of the ways in which this kind of research can result in small- and large-scale reform of teacher education. The power of these essays rests largely in the fact that they are personal stories of the successes and conflicts of newly hired teacher educators as they struggle to find their places within departments and schools of education. In these stories, beginning faculty members describe their efforts to "practice what they preach" and to make sure that they are " 'walking the talk,' of modeling [their] values for preservice teachers" (pp. 133-134). Section III concludes with a chapter by Ardra Cole and Gary Knowles titled Reform and "Being True to Oneself": Pedagogy, Professional Practice, and the Promotional Process, in which the authors reflect openly on the cost of being true to personal commitments about teaching and research.

The essays included here go far in informing us of the perils and complexity of a university culture in which change is often suspect, and in which tradition often prevails over innovation. At their best, they illuminate the struggles faced by beginning teacher educators, and they provide us with both hope and vision when it comes to supporting beginning faculty and imagining ways to reform traditional models of teacher preparation. These essays make a strong case for what should happen to teacher education programs, but, unfortunately, the results are more ambiguous when it comes to describing leverage points that could help others bring change to teacher education programs and institutions. This ambiguity reflects a tendency, in self-study research, to focus on the immediate experience of the researchers and neglect to embed that experience in theoretically informed accounts of institutional change. Researchers who rely on a methodology that focuses on individual experience may fail to make explicit how such an analysis can help us to pursue effective strategies for institutional reform. The essays in this collection, while inspiring and vi-

sionary, often do not go as far as they might in helping us understand how to navigate within institutional settings where judgments over methodology and pedagogy legitimately come into conflict, or to help us negotiate the issues of power and status embedded in these conflicts. This limitation leaves the authors open to a potential critique of self-study research: that when it is insufficiently informed, both theoretically and politically, it can appear naïve or even petulant.

The commitment of these educators to explore, sometimes quite painfully, the ways that their experiences and beliefs have shaped their teaching, and to use this understanding to find better ways to meet the needs of students who are often quite unlike them, will surely inspire other teacher educators to look more closely at their own practice, and to use that examination as a context for reform. The teacher educators whose work is included in this volume take seriously the need to learn how to "negotiate … and balance … moral commitments to more equitable opportunities for teaching and learning with the demands and limitations of academic life" (Abt-Perkins, Dale, and Hauschildt, p. 96), and they remain unwilling to give up on moral commitments in order to fit more comfortably into the academic world.

This message constitutes the heart of *The Heart of the Matter*, and it challenges, in one way or another, the status quo of teacher education programs. The focus is on teaching, the heart of teacher education, and on the very real risks that beginning teacher educators face when they are committed to reform in light of their moral and philosophical beliefs about what constitutes good teaching and research. These educators are working to *reform* the programs they are a part of, in light of deeply held beliefs about teaching and teachers, rather than *responding* to particular events and institutional expectations. They emerge as strong voices modeling and supporting a vision of teacher education, both for their colleagues in teacher education and for the prospective teachers they educate, and, as such, provide hope for a future rich with reflection and moral commitment.

The fourth and final section of *The Heart of the Matter* provides a chance for deans and more senior teacher educators to respond to the concerns and questions voiced by the beginning teacher educators in earlier sections. Their comments vary widely. Gary Galluzzo suggests that rather than trying to change the academy or learning to live within it, teacher educators should leave and pursue the work of preparing teachers in "statewide unaffiliated, graduate schools of education in regional locations around the state" (Galluzzo, p. 405). Somewhat cynically, Roger Soder explains that he is largely "unmoved" by the six recurring claims he identifies in the collected essays. Soder's notes that the authors of the essays in the previous sections are naïve and should have known what to expect when they entered the academy. His lack of sympathy for the struggles of beginning professors unfortunately reads like an apology for the status quo, despite the fact that his own work at The Center for Educational Renewal suggests quite the opposite. Soder pursues a legitimate critique of the insufficiently theorized understanding of institutional change offered in some of the essays, but ends up writing off the work and experiences of these authors too quickly and too finally.

Fortunately for readers who hope for a more optimistic outlook, pictures painted by other deans are less bleak. Rena Upitis describes her experience as a new dean in musical terms, drawing on her experience as an artist to explore the ways in which she can "invent further structures that make it possible for individuals to find better ways of balancing their personal and professional needs" (Upitis, p. 479). She engages in her own self-study project as she explores her emerging role as a dean. Carol Bartell is committed to the idea that "newcomers help to define what an organization will become" (Bartell, p. 443), and offers concrete suggestions to new faculty seeking to find a place in the academy. Terrence Boak and Richard Wisniewski also provide specific examples of the ways that they and the other administrators they work with provide support for new faculty. These perspectives help to alleviate the sense of inevitability left by Soder's essay, as well as encourage us in the belief that "schools of education will … become places more conducive to the serious work associated with substantially reforming … institutions of learning at *all* levels" (Knowles and Cole, p. 385).

The Heart of the Matter presents a picture of the kinds of teacher educators we might hope all prospective teachers encounter in their professional lives. It also proposes a different picture of the work that needs to be accomplished, and of the support that needs to be provided, *if* innovative reflective, teacher educators are to be successful preparing effective teachers. Ardra Cole, Rosebud Elijah, and Gary Knowles's collection provides a much needed portrait of the work of teacher educators committed to reforming teacher education, and go far to discredit the idea that teacher educators are at the root of the perceived crisis in American education.

Codes and Contradictions: Race, Gender Identity and Schooling

by J. D. Weiler

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Reviewed by Paulette Patterson Dilworth

Public schools are likely to have little control over some of the factors, such as family structure and socio-economic status, that may be related to early student withdrawal. However, educational practices and policies can be changed if elements in the school environment contribute to students' non-persistence to graduation. The schooling experiences of dropouts and graduates can vary. Some differences may include the ability to get along with teachers, class attendance and engagement, participation in school activities, friendship networks, and a sense of belonging. The two groups tend to have different perceptions and reactions to the school environment. One aspect of dropouts that is overlooked is the extent to which factors related to race/ethnicity, gender, and social class interact to encourage persistence or contribute to school withdrawal. Moreover, comparisons of identity formation among particular racialized groups are rarely undertaken to examine how such processes shape the academic experiences and future goals of young working class females. *Codes and Contradictions* by Jeanne D. Weiler is a notable effort concerned with uncovering some of the meanings associated with race/ethnicity, gender, social class, identity formation, and young working class females.

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Weiler explores the school processes shaping the young women's gender identities. Her book provides evidence that female gender identity among various racialized groups can be very different. In the United States, schooling plays a powerful role in determining access and opportunity to mobility up the socio-economic ladder. In some instances, traditional forms of public schooling contribute to unequal outcomes for different groups of students. In this case study of young women enrolled in an alternative high school the author explores gender identity as it is constructed within a dropout-prevention program. Five questions are central to the authors' analyses and discussion. How do young working-class women of different racial/ethnic origins define the possibilities for themselves as adult women? How do young working-class women understand the potential for education to affect their future success? How do young working class women construct the importance of school as an avenue for achieving their future goals? How are the views of young women shaped by their own experiences in their racial/ethnic communities and economic context? What role does the school play in shaping and creating the understanding held by young working class women? Weiler frames her research around these questions to understand the meanings young working class females attached to their lived experiences, academic pursuits, and anticipated future.

This book is an important contribution to our understanding of the codes and contradictions of schooling that work to shape and inform the lives of young working-class women. First, the work links research on minority status and school processes to issues of identity formation. Second, the work contributes to the tradition and development of feminist research by responding to the problematic nature of race/ethnicity, gender, and social class. The results of Weiler's study reveal that even within "progressive" educational settings, through various processes, schools promote contradictory gender codes of femininity. At times, those codes may emphasize aca-

demic mastery and economic independence and at other times condone "traditional" patterns of gendered, racialized, and cultural interactions.

In the Introduction, the author situates the case study in the larger school dropout problem, the processes of schooling, and identity formation. Weiler points out that much of the work that has been done in those areas paid little attention to the intersection of race/ethnicity, gender, and social class. Challenging the premise inherent in previous research on youth cultural studies, Weiler posits that identity formation among girls within particular social class groupings can vary. Weiler also explains why the study was conceptualized from a feminist perspective. The focus on the lived experiences of young working class females can likely reveal important features about how different groups of women experience the world. Also, conceptualizing the multiple realities of the lives of young working class women adds a broader dimension to understanding the academic and social reality of women's everyday experiences.

In Chapter 2, the author begins with a critical review of educational research on social class, race/ethnicity, gender, and schooling. Beginning with a discussion of research relating to social reproduction theorists (e.g., Althusser [1985] and Bowles and Gintis [1976], the author notes the weakness of early social class research to adequately address human agency. She goes on to systematically examine the manner in which the structural and cultural analyses of educational processes have aided our understanding of social reproduction. Citing critical scholars such as Giroux (1983), Apple (1982), and Wexler and Whitson (1982), Weiler notes that research on the "racial dynamics of social reproduction have remained marginal to the central concerns with social class" (p. 15). From this review, the author concludes that we cannot simply extrapolate from this research on females or minority youth to conceptualize the experiences of young women of different backgrounds. Weiler explains that such a process is merely additive in nature and reveals very little about the intersection of racialized and gendered experiences for working class women.

The author develops Chapter 3 to situate the lived experiences of working class girls within a broad socioeconomic context. Weiler argues some working class women's response to schooling are likely being shaped by the social, political, and economic status of their reference groups. Drawing on secondary sources the author attempts to give the reader a sense of the socioeconomic factors that contextualize the everyday lives of young working class women. Those details include women's labor force participation, marital status, family composition, earnings and income, unemployment, and poverty. Other factors influencing the lived experiences of working class women include educational characteristics such as academic attainment and the local context of schooling. From this research the author concludes that to accurately depict the experiences of young women of differing backgrounds, the broader socio-economic context of schooling must be considered.

In later chapters the author introduces the reader to the young women who participated in the case study. Data collected from the author's year-long engagement with working class females enrolled in an alternative high school in New York City is also presented. Interestingly, the various accounts reveal that the young women express and embrace specific cultural notions of schooling and their future plans. In the case of white females, Weiler's analysis reveals that the young women demonstrate a range of identities that alternate between employment before marriage and balancing part-time work with domestic concerns. For the white females three distinct categories emerged to characterize their views of future anticipated paid work and family: girls who express a primary focus on getting a job and having a career, girls who center their future on family concerns, and girls who have not clearly defined their views about employment and family life. I found Weiler's analysis of young African American and Puerto Rican women to be problematic. In her analysis of the lived experiences of these young women, the author presents a rationale for grouping them together based on their common history of "nonvoluntary" migration to the United States. Weiler's justification depends on Ogbu's (1989) work where he argues that "involuntary minorities are people who were initially incorporated into U.S. society through slavery, conquest, or colonization" (cited in Weiler, p. 73). While

it is true that both groups have experienced racism and discrimination in all aspects of social life, those experiences should not be viewed through the same lens. The lived experiences of working class African American and Puerto Rican women are not monolithic. To claim that they are somewhat distorts this portrait of schooling and the lived experiences of these two groups of women. Between these two groups there are likely to be a range of socio-cultural experiences to characterize their everyday lives. However, Weiler concludes that African American and Puerto Rican women express a positive orientation toward educational attainment, a strong commitment to future employment, and less emphasis on domestic concerns. The author notes that when compared to working class white females, African American and Puerto Rican females tend to focus less on boyfriends and romance.

In Chapter 6 Weiler examines the lived experiences of young women of Dominican and South American descent. Ten Latina females are the focus of data analyzed in the chapter. For this group of young immigrant women, the author concludes that educational attainment is their priority. There appeared to be differences between Latina females who were performing well academically and those who were at risk for academic failure. Weiler argues that those Latina females who were most engaged academically tended to express future goals in terms of educational attainment. In contrast, young working class Latina women who were less academically engaged tended to express their future goals in terms of domestic concerns like romantic relationships and having children.

Taken together these results suggest that young working class women express a range of perspectives about their future and domestic concerns. Wieler notes that the "range in responses to future work and family also appears to reflect the tension" that these girls experiences in families and communities.

Weiler takes the reader inside Alternative High School where she explores the school-based factors that are working to shape the views of the women. In her study, Weiler describes particular incentives (i.e., a chance to graduate), disciplinary practices, and teacher-student interactions that appear to foster hope for these young women. Weiler notes—and I tend to agree with her observation—"that through the very act of attending A.H.S. the young women appear to be invested in obtaining educational qualifications" (p. 144). The author uses Bernstein's theory of pedagogical practices to explain how the young women experience the formal school curriculum. The effect of an "invisible pedagogy" and weakly defined student-teacher boundaries seems to help the young women learn about important ways to control their own destinies. Weiler observes that for these young working class women, learning to become skilled negotiators may help them develop the ability to navigate and control their own working conditions and future domestic concerns. In this chapter an important insight is that an implemented curriculum that includes "common sense" and draws from the students' lived experience is more likely to produce positive outcomes for some working class females who may be at risk for school failure.

An important proposition of this study is that schools can exist as emancipating sites where young women can visualize alternatives to dropping out and school failure. Schools have the power to help young women construct positive visions for their future and, as this useful book illustrates, they can also help young people deconstruct the social and educational reality of injustice and inequality.

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Elusive Culture: Schooling, Race, and Identity in Global Times

by Daniel A. Yon

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Daniel Yon's book, *Elusive Culture: Schooling, Race, and Identity in Global Times*, has caused me to rethink and challenge my current paradigms in multicultural and anti-racist education. He contrasts current thinking about culture, race, and identity as a set of attributes that create clear distinctions with a more "elusive" definition of these terms in which identity, race, and culture are in flux, responding to the social world. He sees this book as "an attempt to gesture toward a more open and pervasive view of culture, which is not only a product or a set of attributes that can be claimed and neatly recorded, but more significantly a process that is ongoing" (p. 5).

Yon uses the power of youth voices to bring out the elusive nature of culture, race, and one's identity in a world that is growing smaller each day. Through an ethnographic study of a diverse group of urban high school students in Toronto, Yon challenges the reader to look at the slippery nature of identity, race, and culture as students live out these constructs in Maple Heights secondary school. During the year that he spent at the school, he interviewed faculty and many students regarding issues of culture, race, and one's identity, led discussions on the topics, and observed class discussions and student events. Yon uses the discourse of race and culture, gathered through conversations and interviews, to paint portraits of student identities, which are juxtaposed against the old accepted definitions of race, culture, and identity.

Yon begins the book with an historical and theoretical context of race, identity, and culture through which the reader can understand and critique his conception of "elusive culture." He views the current status of multiculturalism and anti-racism's view of culture as a "set of knowable attributes that value the mutual coexistence of culture as discrete and bounded entities" (p. 21). Though Yon recognizes the political value in a "reductionist" view of race and culture, he believes that such a view should not come at the expense of "disavowing" the complexities of culture in which cultural and racial attributes are blurred and identity is in flux. His book allows us to see the tensions and contradictions that occur among the youth at Maple Heights as they try to make sense of race, culture, and identity.

He begins his portraits with a glimpse of the Maple Heights teachers' perspectives on race and culture in the school. The teachers' discourse supported, most of the time, the anti-racist and multicultural view of race and culture as discrete entities. Unlike the students who for the most part transgressed borders, the teachers saw borders between races and would use these borders to build their assumptive world. Teachers discussed issues like academics, violence, and crime in terms of binary oppositions in which some groups are favored over others, such as black Canadians who receive all the attention while the non-whites and other minorities receive little. This same perspective came out in teacher discussions regarding pedagogy. One teacher stated, I have to "change in order to teach to accommodate…. I have to change to the twenty percent" (who are minority students) (p. 40). Such a binary perspective creates feelings of anxiety and even animosity as teachers try to deal with the complexity of diverse classrooms. These bifurcated perspectives contrast with the youth's views of culture, race, and identity as shifting and contradictory.

In his portraits of youth, Yon focuses each chapter on a specific topic such as culture, then race, and finally on race and gender. Though discussed individually, each chapter reveals a series of tensions and contradictions within and between student responses, as well as between student's discourse and their actions. The book provides rich and complex accounts that reveal many nuances of the complexities of youth discourse around these issues. I will choose some key stories that point out the various contradictions among race, culture, and identity that students live out.

Two predominant contexts, the urban environment and popular culture, inform and shape many

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students' conceptions of the relationship between race, culture, and identity. Yon points out that the youth "take part in an urban culture characterized by hybridity, creolization, and flux" (p. 59). Constructs or conceptions of the cultures within the school are often based on signifiers from popular culture such as dress codes, music, and dance. Many of the students based their group identification and affiliation, which sometimes transgressed the usual boundaries of culture and race, on elements of urban culture. For example, Marta, an immigrant from Serbia, identifies most strongly with the Spanish culture in the school, specifically their music, dress, and dance. When she revealed this in a discussion group others sat in disbelief. But Yon points out that the identification is based on elements like genre of music, mode of dress and style of dancing. Her determination that these popular signifiers, which she enjoyed, were Spanish reflected the often racialized view of different aspects of culture. These racialized perspectives of culture created borders that for some students should not be transgressed, such as student's questions about Marta's identification with the Spanish group.

In another example, Jose from El Salvador is looked upon by the Spanish boys in the school as a "black wanna-be," because of the way he dresses, and his association with black students. In addition, he fits other black stereotypes such as playing basketball and listening to rap music. But just as other students do not want to be pigeonholed or policed by their peers, Jose points out that, "if they call it [rap music] black music, then I wouldn't be listening to it" (p. 95), because Jose sees himself as Spanish. Jose presents contradictory statements in reference to his identity. First, he stated that he prefers to be seen as just black not a "black wanna-be." And then second, makes the comment that clearly he is Spanish. To add to the various contradictions in Jose's discourse, is his judgment of non-black girls who listened to African music or dressed with African insignia on their clothing. He called these girls "black wanna-bes." In several of the youth's conversations, as Jose did, they applied a double standard in which they did not want to be judged for choices that did not seem to fit the "norm," but would express concern about other's choices that varied from the norm.

Further contradictions occurred around issues of race. The youth, many of whom are immigrants or first generation Canadians, do not necessarily take their identities from their roots. Yon makes a wonderful play on words that points out the role of relationships in helping students form identities. Yon states that the social relationships that help form various youth's identities have more to do with routes, "the various trajectories, interactions, and networks through which these youth are connected, than with 'roots,' or countries of origin, birth places, and ethnicity" (p. 64). This comes out in youth's discussion on who is black. Culture and race become blurred with some roots more informative of outsiders' views of one's culture or race. For example, the Guyanese students who are racially black are not seen as part of the black students in the school, while those who come from the Caribbean are considered black. And to add further confusion, when Trevor a Jamaican Canadian was asked if black Canadians, who had been living in Canada for several generations, were black, he noted that they are Canadians. Certain blacks were seen as connected to their roots or country of origin, while other blacks were considered black because of their routes or relationship to others. Yon's use of the term *route* points to the ambiguity of culture versus the usual reference to *roots*, which is based on a concept of fixed origins.

The few white Canadian, non-immigrant students included in the book, interestingly view themselves often as Canadians—similar to whites in the United States. They did not discuss or reveal such shifting identities or Yon did not choose to include any who did. In fact, white actions were often not racialized. For example, Anna described fights in the school between various races or cultures as distinctly between certain races, but they became "just fights" when they were between two white students. In another case, when a white male takes on the popular signifiers of black culture he is not seen as a "wigger" (white nigger), but when a light-skinned Guyanese male takes on the same attributes he is considered a "wigger." Yon quotes Dyer who stated that "whiteness becomes the space for anything and nothing" (p. 67). Such a privileged space may occur because whites do have to contend with such questions regarding identity.

Yon's book raises interesting questions for multiculturalists, anti-racists, and anyone interested in fostering a critical and cultural awareness. For example, does immersion into elusive youth culture occur out of desire to "fit-in" or find one's self? Or simply out of interest? Is this elusive culture a youthful, adolescent pattern? Or is it a window as to where this generation may be taking the world? Yon notes that the youth are in a "cultural in-space" between the adult world of work and the adolescent life which allows youth to experiment and play with their identity. Does this mean that the youth, when they become adults, will then move to the typical paradigm of race, culture, and identity in which there are clearer distinctions and boundaries, much like the teachers articulated? As popular culture changes so do the signifiers. Does this also mean that identity and perceptions of culture and race will change with it? These questions not only critique some of the limitations of Yon's work, but also make me ponder the future of multicultural and anti-racist education.

A colleague recently told me that we are ready in multicultural education to make another shift to a new understanding of relationships among race, culture and identity. Yon was quite successful in attempting to move the reader out of a stagnant view of these constructs, as he tried to "fix" a picture of something quite elusive—culture that is shifting and fluid. The youth voices in Yon's book challenge our current conceptions of these constructs and cause us to question. Yon's book is a step toward helping us move out of our current comfortable paradigms to ones that will create more questions than